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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Southeast Asia’s most dangerous terrorist 
threat. Since the group manifested its presence with its suicide bombings in Bali, 
Indonesia on October 12, 2002, considerable efforts have been devoted to describing the 
group responsible for the most damaging terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia and 
interpreting how it has changed over time. Over the course of the last decade, two 
competing interpretations of JI emerged. One view held that JI was divided between a 
large group of traditionalists and a smaller group of pro-violence militants. This became 
the conventional wisdom and served as the foundation for most countries’ 
counterterrorism policies. The other held that the two factions worked closely together. 
By reconsidering JI’s evolution in light of recently available evidence, this thesis shows 
that the second view more accurately describes JI. In particular, this thesis suggests that 
the two factions should be viewed as mutually supportive “administrative” and 
“operational” components of a single, adaptable terrorist group. To be successful over the 
long term, counterterrorism policies will need to pay greater attention to the 
administrative faction and its relationship to the operational wing, which conducts actual 
terrorist attacks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Terrorist groups evolve in different ways. Some terrorist groups end while others 
“adapt over time into more-effective organizations and become increasingly dangerous 
threats.”1 This thesis studies the evolution of a terrorist group that has not ended—
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). This thesis asks the question: how has JI evolved?  
JI is Southeast Asia’s (SEA) largest and deadliest Islamist terrorist network. Over 
the past decade, JI operatives conducted five major terrorist attacks in Indonesia, 
beginning with the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing that killed more than 200 people.2 In 
each of the next three years, they launched a single, well-planned suicide bombing attack 
against Western hotels or embassies in Jakarta and Bali.3 These attacks cemented JI’s 
position as the leading terrorist network in Southeast Asia.4 JI’s operatives did not launch 
another attack until 2009. The four-year gap led most observers to conclude that 
Indonesia’s success in killing or detaining many of the group’s top leaders had badly 
damaged JI’s capacity to carry out further attacks.5 However, the 2009 attack against two 
U.S. hotels in Jakarta demonstrated that the JI network remains the most serious terrorist 
                                                 
1 Brian A. Jackson et al., “Volume One: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its 
Implications for Combating Terrorism,” Aptitude for Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), III; 
and Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), xiii.  
2 Zachary Abuza, “Jemaah Islamiyah and Islamist Terrorism,” Political Islam and Violence in 
Indonesia (New York, NY: Routledge Publishers, 2007), 37. 




4 Zachary Abuza, “Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward,” Terrorism Monitor: In-
Depth Analysis of the War on Terror, The Jamestown Foundation VIII, 2 (January 14, 2010), 6-8; Peter 
Chalk and Carl Ungerer, “Neighbourhood Watch: The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia,” 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (June 2008), 5;  and Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, “Local Jihad: 
Radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute (September 2005), 51. 
5 Sidney Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 59, 2 (2005), 175. 
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threat in Southeast Asia.6 Together with recent reports that JI leaders formed a jihadi 
coalition called al-Qaeda in Aceh (AQA) and planned to assassinate Indonesia’s 
president, the attack strongly indicates that JI’s leadership, organization, and tactics have 
changed in ways that few observers predicted. Thus, recent developments not only create 
a need to describe how JI has evolved but they also present an opportunity to reassess 
conventional interpretations about how JI changed in response to internal and external 
pressures on the group.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Recent investigations on JI are illuminating. JI members remain committed to 
attacking Western targets. They have expanded their target set to include Indonesian 
government officials, and are executing precision small arms assaults.7 Individuals linked 
to JI are still willing to wage jihad to establish an Islamic state, but they appear frustrated 
with JI traditionalists’ empty rhetoric and the late Noordin Top’s pro-bombing faction’s 
tactics and lack of direction.8 These recent events challenge the conventional wisdom 
about JI and make analyzing JI’s evolution important. By analyzing JI’s evolution, the 
author has determined how JI’s leaders have adapted the network’s organization and 
tactics, and described as accurately as possible the nature of the threat that JI poses today 
and for the future.  
The primary purpose of this thesis is to describe JI’s evolution. Describing JI’s 
evolution is important for two reasons: (1) the need to understand what JI has become 
today in order to properly evaluate the threat it poses to U.S. and Indonesian interests, 
                                                 
6 Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, 37; John Aglionby, "Al-Qaeda Link Is Suspected 
in Jakarta Blasts," The Washington Post, July 18, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/17/AR2009071700756.html; Farouk Arnaz, “Terrorist Plotting Attack on 
President, Foreigners,” The Jakarta Globe, May 14, 2010, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/terrorists-
plotting-attack-on-president-foreigners/374937; and James C. Whitmire, “Jemaah Islamiyah Remains 
Active and Deadly,” in Michael T. Kindt and Post Jerrold, M., Schneider Barry R. eds., The Most 
Threatening Networks and Criminal Gangs (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 2009), 179. 
7 Binsar Bakkara, “Indonesia’s Changing Face of Terrorism,” The Associated Press, October 10, 2010, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gLNypKBPAsAvcTpxrJBAfgsjzSIgD9IOMQV80?
docId=D9IOMQV80; and Farouk Arnaz, “Terrorist Plotting Attack on President, Foreigners,” The Jakarta 
Globe, May 14, 2010, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/terrorists-plotting-attack-on-president-
foreigners/374937. 
8 “Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh,” ICG Asia Report 189 (April 2010), i.  
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and (2) the broader need to understand how terrorist groups might evolve. Having 
completed his purpose, in this thesis the author offers a description that could influence 
the revision of conventional interpretations of JI’s evolution. 
JI’s attacks have been deadly. JI’s high-profile bombings between 2002 and 2009 
killed over 300 people and injured close to 700 people.9 Before that, JI operatives carried 
out several, near-simultaneous bombing attacks on 38 churches or priests in 2000 where 
19 people were killed and around 120 people wounded, and JI members participated in 
communal conflicts in the Malukus and Sulawesi where countless people were hurt or 
killed.10 Moreover, JI members assisted in at least one confirmed joint attack with the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) where 116 people were killed.11 The latest attack in 2009 and 
investigations since strongly indicate remaining JI leaders are evolving their organization 
and tactics, so that they can continue to execute major terrorist attacks as well as 
regenerate their support base using more nonviolent means. The JI network still 
represents the most serious security threat in the region. Despite the variety of pressures 
placed on the JI network, its operatives are adapting in ways that enable them to present a 
new yet still devastating danger to Indonesian and American interests. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis tackles a major analytical problem in the study of the JI terrorist 
network: the evolution of JI. The challenge is that there are two competing interpretations 
that describe how JI has evolved. The first and leading interpretation until 2009 suggests 
JI splintered into two distinct factions, “including one which opposes the current 
bombing campaign.”12 The two factions share a desire to use jihad to accomplish their 
                                                 
9 Peter Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 99. The Bali bombings in 2002 killed 202 and injured 209. JI’s 2003 Jakarta 
hotel bombing killed 12 and injured 150. The Australian Embassy bombing in 2004 killed 11 and injured 
200. Bali II in 2005 killed 25 and injured 129, and JI’s latest suicide bombings in 2009 killed 9 and 
wounded at least 50. 
10 “Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates,” ICG Asia 
Report 43, (December 2002), 5. 
11 Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 99. 
12 Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, 37-39. 
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objectives, but the first group referred to as “traditionalists” believes bomb attacks are 
counterproductive.13 Traditionalists who have a long-term jihad strategy argue JI 
members should be preparing Indonesia and Southeast Asia for jihad through religious 
outreach and military preparation. In the eyes of the traditionalists, “the personnel and the 
strength to carry out jihad are both lacking.”14 The second faction, known as “radicals,” 
“pro-bombers,” or what the author refers to as the “pro-violence” faction led most 
recently by the late Noordin Top, wage jihad by carrying out terrorist attacks on U.S. and 
Indonesian interests now.15 The second interpretation for how JI has evolved admits 
internal debate within the JI network exists, but argues the splintering of factions is 
overstated. It suggests JI remains a far more cohesive group whose leaders have learned 
and adapted to their environment in ways that allow it to survive, sustain its operations, 
and continue to advance the goals of the movement.16 This thesis and its description of 
JI’s evolution will reinforce the accuracy of the second interpretation.  
The author argues that despite internal differences within the organization, JI 
factions remained cohesive and were closer to a delineation of functions: administrative 
and operational. This division of responsibility allowed JI’s faction leaders to sustain and 
improve upon their organizational structure as well as operations and tactics, which 
supported JI pro-violence actors in their efforts without sacrificing the long-term strategy 
of the group or exposing traditionalists to counterterrorism measures. The author’s 
description of JI’s evolution shows how traditionalists and pro-violence elements 
supported, not detracted from, one another’s activities. The author’s hypothesis is that 
JI’s leaders have evolved the network into an increasingly complicated and sophisticated 
movement. JI’s leaders have changed the organization’s structure and their commands 
execute different sets of operations and tactics, but they converge their efforts when 
necessary because they remain united through their ideology. As such, JI pro-violence 
 
                                                 
13 Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, 37-39; ICG Asia Report 189, 14; and “Indonesia 
Backgrounder: Jihad Central Sulawesi,” ICG Asia Report 74 (February 2004), 1–4. 
14 ICG Asia Report 189, 14. 
15 Ibid., 14. 
16 Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia, 40. 
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terrorists and traditionalists collectively work towards JI’s near- and long-term strategies 
to create a pan-Islamic state, which represents a progressively more dangerous threat to 
American and Indonesian interests.  
The author argues that over the past twenty years, JI traditionalists and pro-
violence leaders have adjusted their organization, operations, and tactics in order to 
survive, improve, and make progress toward their intended objectives. By examining JI 
over the course of three distinct periods of time, the author shows JI is a more coherent 
network than some analysts have acknowledged. This description, explored in greater 
detail both in the literature review and in this thesis, allows the readers to better 
understand the nature of the JI threat faced today.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over its short but violent twenty-year history, JI has evolved in many ways. This 
literature review briefly describes how JI has changed. It shows that JI’s ideology 
provided continuity, and that organizational, operational and tactical changes allowed the 
organization to remain focused, connected, capable of carrying out terrorist attacks, and 
thus advanced it towards its goals. The author begins by introducing the conventional 
wisdom on how terrorist groups evolve into more effective organizations and become 
increasingly dangerous threats. He describes the significance of ideology, leadership, 
organizational structure and operations and tactics, and how capturing changes in them 
illustrates how terrorist groups evolve in order to remain coherent organizations and 
continue to carry out attacks. Bound together through their ideology, JI’s leaders evolved 
the organization and its operations and tactics three times in response to internal and 
external pressures. Therefore, this literature review is organized around JI’s development 
and evolution over three periods of time. 
In the first time period, JI’s inception in 1993 up through Bali 2002, JI’s founders 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir along with men picked to be JI’s core leaders 
created a strong religious ideology, established a cohesive organization, and developed an 
operational and tactical repertoire. This allowed JI to operate as a major terrorist 
organization, culminating in the 2002 Bali bombings. In the second time period, post-Bali 
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2002 through Jakarta 2009, the author highlights the various government responses to JI 
and how JI leaders changed JI’s organizational structure and tactics following the 2002 
Bali bombings crackdown so that the group could continue to operate and execute major 
attacks, ending with the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings. In the third time period—post-
Jakarta 2009 to the present—the author discusses the Indonesian government’s response 
to the 2009 Jakarta bombings and how JI leaders are adapting their organizational 
structure and tactics to counter the CT policies of the Indonesian and U.S. governments, 
which led to the successful dismantling of the JI cell responsible for the Jakarta attack. JI 
leaders joined forces with other jihadi movements to form the AQA coalition, and its 
operatives are planning and carrying out guerilla-style ambushes on Indonesian 
authorities. JI’s latest evolution is an example of how terrorist groups learn and change in 
order to survive and sustain further terrorist attacks. The literature review concludes with 
the presentation of the two competing interpretations of how JI has evolved and why 
analysts should reconsider conventional descriptions of how JI has evolved. 
1. Current Knowledge on the Adaptation and Evolution of Terrorist 
Groups  
There are several explanations for why some terrorist groups last longer than 
others, namely “ideological motivation, economic conditions, regime type, the size of 
groups, and/or the breadth of terrorist goals.”17 Ideology, particularly those with 
nationalist or religious goals, seems to allow terrorist groups to last the longest. Poor 
economic conditions “may heighten grievances, which provide a more supportive 
environment for terrorist groups and increase their longevity.”18 On the other hand, a 
regime like a democracy is “associated with less discrimination and repression,” and may 
entice terrorist groups to entertain the idea of nonviolent political participation.19 
Terrorist group size also allows it to survive, with larger groups being able to survive 
longer than smaller groups because “they have more resources…can sustain activities 
longer than smaller groups…and can endure government pressure to break the group up 
                                                 
17 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida, 15. 
18 Ibid., 16. 
19 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida, 17. 
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since they have more members and resources.”20 Lastly, the breadth of terrorist goals also 
affects a terrorist group’s ability to survive; Jones and Libicki have found that “the 
broader the goals of terrorist groups, the less likely they are able to achieve them, and the 
more willing they are to use nonviolence to achieve them.”21 This observation boils down 
to cost-benefit analyses by terrorist group leaders. Leaders weigh how much benefit their 
group gains from a terrorist attack against how much pressure their group can endure 
once a government responds. In other words, terrorism often provokes more repression 
than it offers achievement of broad objectives.22  
When a terrorist group survives, it often has adapted and evolved into a more 
effective organization and may become an increasingly dangerous threat. A terrorist 
group evolves when it can learn from its experiences, and from those experiences, it “can 
act systematically to fulfill its needs, strengthen its capabilities, and advance its strategic 
agenda.” 23 It can  
develop, improve, and employ new skills that can enable it to change its 
capabilities over time, one of the most important being the ability to 
thwart countermeasures and improve its chance of surviving attempts to 
destroy it, and preserve the capabilities it has developed even if some of its 
members are lost.24  
Thus, tangible changes in organizational structure and operations and tactics are 
indicators of the ability to learn. As Jackson found, “The greater a group’s learning 
capabilities, the more threat it poses to adversaries and the more resilient it is to the 
pressures exerted by law-enforcement and intelligence agencies.”25 The most enduring 
terrorist groups have been marked by their ability to “innovate and learn across a number 
of dimensions.”26 Terrorist groups that evolve into more effective organizations and 
                                                 
20 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida, 18–19. 
21 Ibid., 15, 24–26. 
22 Ibid., 24–26. 
23 Ibid., ix. 
24 Ibid., ix. 
25 Brian A. Jackson et al., “Volume Two: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist 
Groups,” Aptitude for Destruction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 2. 
26 Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction, vol. 2, 179. 
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increasingly dangerous threats are those that learn as an organization: “When knowledge 
is organizational, a group acquires new knowledge or capabilities that can improve 
existing capabilities and advance the aims of the group, which creates a capacity that 
goes beyond dependence on any individual member.”27 Evidence shows that JI has 
learned and adapted collectively in spite of internal differences.  
2. Understanding the Ideology and Capabilities of Terrorist Groups 
Terrorist group ideology, leadership, organizational structure, and operations and 
tactics  are the factors that “sustain a group’s existence as a coherent entity and allow it to 
conduct a series of successful attacks.”28 A terrorist group often has to learn how to 
change, protect, and improve upon its capabilities in order to survive. These include 
leadership, organization, operations and tactical skills so that it can continue to carry out 
near- and long-term strategies. By showing how JI’s leaders evolved the organization into 
administrative and operational functions the author illustrates that JI traditionalists and 
pro-violence elements share their ideology and capabilities with one another. As such, the 
author presents an alternative view of JI.29  
3. From Inception to Bali Bombing 2002 
JI’s twenty-year history is well known by those who study security in Southeast 
Asia. Inspired by their experiences during the Anti-Soviet War in Afghanistan, in the mid 
80s two Indonesians and Darul Islam (DI) members Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir developed a vision that Muslims should be actively waging jihad against the 
Indonesian state and its Western supporters in order to establish an Islamic state. To 
breathe this vision to life, the two decided to “create a disciplined and militarily capable 
organization” that would lead this struggle.30 Sungkar and Ba’asyir founded JI in 1993 
                                                 
27 Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction, vol. 2, 181–182. 
28 Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, United States Air Force, RAND Corporation and Project Air Force 
(U.S.), The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a 
Changing World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 4. 
29 Ibid., 4. 
30 Fealy and Borgu, “Local Jihad: Radical Islam and terrorism in Indonesia,” 25–26. 
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while they were exiled in Malaysia. From inception to early 2000, the two established 
and developed JI into a coherent terrorist network aimed at creating a pan-Islamic state to 
be won through widespread, violent jihad.31  
Sungkar and Ba’asyir preached JI’s ideology, mapped out their vision of the JI 
network, and built JI’s membership base. JI’s ideology advocates establishing a caliphate 
won through unlimited, violent jihad. They envisioned JI as a hierarchical network 
consisting of an amir and four councils who advise the amir, one of which oversees a 
central command, which in turn controls regional commands across Southeast Asia 
known as mantiqi. Mantiqis are made up of subdivisions called wakalah and consist of 
branches called qirdas made up of cells or fiah. JI members were recruited from all over 
Southeast Asia. Pious Muslims picked to be part of JI overwhelmingly demonstrated 
commitment to Islam and obedience to the organization.32  
Importantly, Sungkar and Ba’asyir brought in dedicated, charismatic men with 
whom they had bonded with during the Anti-Soviet War and charged these commanders 
with the responsibility of building the JI network. These operational leaders were fiercely 
loyal to Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and the JI ideology. JI leaders developed religious, 
ideological, and military training programs to cultivate their recruits into dedicated JI 
members. JI’s core leaders established and led the mantiqis, where they were responsible 
for recruitment and generating financial and military resources. Each mantiqi was 
                                                 
31 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003), 71, 125-128; “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the ‘Ngruki Network’ in 
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autonomous, but mantiqis also supported each other when needed.33 Mantiqi leaders 
established complex, relationships with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups throughout 
Southeast Asia.34 For close to seven years, JI leaders shaped their mantiqis into a 
coherent, far-reaching network with dedicated members and core capabilities that would 
allow them to support a sustained campaign of terrorist attacks. When Suharto fell in 
1998, Sungkar and Ba’asyir made Indonesia JI’s operational nucleus by beginning to 
expand its network under the umbrella of political Islam and participation in communal 
conflicts.35  
In the late 1990s, communal conflicts in Indonesia provided the opportunity for JI 
leaders to recruit new members, establish paramilitary cells, and participate in violent and 
non-violent jihad.36 Al-Qaeda “provided significant funding, financial infrastructure, 
training, and arming of JI militants” which improved JI’s sustainment capacity.37 Thus, JI 
members carried out near-simultaneous bombing attacks against thirty-eight churches 
across five provinces on Christmas Eve in 2000.38 In these attacks, the nature of JI’s 
sophisticated operational skills and its cohesive character could clearly be seen.  
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152; and Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 172-175. 
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In 2001, JI leaders shifted tactics to full-blown terrorism.39 Members of JI’s 
Singapore cell developed attack plans for JI’s first major terrorist attacks against 
hardened U.S. and Western targets. Hambali, JI’s overall operational commander, agreed 
to the plan to carry out “major suicide truck bombs with several tons of ammonium 
nitrate against targets in Singapore.”40 Before the Singapore cell could execute, 
Singaporean and Malaysian authorities foiled the attack and subsequently dismantled JI 
cells in their countries. Interrogations of detainees illuminated JI leaders’ intent to attack 
U.S. targets and interests throughout the region. The information was shared with 
Philippine authorities, which enabled them to identify and dismantle the JI cell in that 
country.41  
In the midst of losses in members and resources as a result of counterterrorism 
(CT) operations in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, the leaders and members of 
the JI network regrouped and adapted their organization’s tactics, which signifies JI’s 
first major evolution. Hambali changed his target choice to “soft” economic targets 
frequented by Westerners. The first such target was the Sari nightclub in Bali. JI 
successfully carried out this suicide bombing attack on October 12, 2002, killing 202 
people. This attack showed that despite earlier losses JI leaders could adapt the 
organization to its environment, and further demonstrated that JI was cohesive enough 
and had the capacity to coordinate across regions and carry out a major attack. It also 
announced JI as the paramount terrorist organization in Indonesia.42 
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40 Ibid., 138, 155–158. 
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4. Post-Bali 2002 to Jakarta 2009 
Bali 2002 provoked a variety of responses from SEA governments and 
Indonesia’s Muslim-majority public. Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines further 
pursued and effectively dismantled JI cells. After the 2002 Bali attack, Indonesian 
officials admitted they had a terrorism problem and gradually cracked down on JI.43 
Investigations of JI’s Singapore and Philippines cells and of the 2002 Bali attack had 
exposed the organized, multi-regional JI network and its ties to al-Qaeda and other 
regional Islamist separatist organizations. SEA governments learned that for the past 
decade, JI leaders had developed a terrorist network that facilitated the acquisition of 
money, training, people, and weapons from all over Southeast Asia.44 Following Bali 
2002, Indonesian and SEA authorities captured or killed somewhere between 200 and 
450 JI members, which included some of JI’s “most prominent and adept operational 
leaders and field commanders.”45 The arrests and evidence that flowed from the Bali 
2002 investigations disrupted JI operations significantly and were “instrumental in 
turning public opinion against JI.”46 After Bali 2002, Indonesia established an elite CT 
entity called Detachment 88 (Det 88) to hunt down JI operatives.47 Due to the pressure 
applied by SEA governments and Indonesia’s Det 88, analysts believed JI was 
constrained both in personnel and resources, and that these constraints exacerbated 
emerging divisions within the organization.  
Some evidence shows internal debate over tactics between JI’s core leaders 
initially developed when Sungkar looked to transition JI’s attacks from sectarian violence 
to “al-Qaeda style” terrorist attacks in 1999. Hambali, leader of Mantiqi I 
(Malaysia/Singapore) and JI’s overall operational commander, supported Sungkar’s 
                                                 
43 “Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” ICG Asia Report 63 (August 
2003), 1. 
44 Barton, Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, 7; and ICG Asia Report 43, 
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initiatives while Ba’asyir and Mantiqi II (Indonesia) leaders argued over the preparedness 
of the environment for jihad and the efficacy of attacking Western targets.48 This internal 
debate continued but did not stop JI operatives from carrying out Bali 2002. The regional 
crackdown on JI and Muslim public backlash following Bali 2002 intensified this debate. 
Mantiqi I leaders were prepared and had demonstrated their willingness to carry out 
violent jihad. Mantiqi II leaders felt JI should be waging war to protect Muslims under 
attack, not executing attacks where Muslims could get killed. Moreover, JI was without a 
“founder” to resolve the debate.49 Sungkar died in 1999 and Ba’asyir was arrested in late 
2002. Hambali was arrested in 2003, but several of his followers, including Dr. Azahari 
and Noordin Top, remained faithful to his al-Qaeda style tactical approach. These two 
men masterminded JI’s 2003, 2004 and 2005 bombings. Mantiqi II leaders, now called 
traditionalists, remained divided over the cost-benefit of suicide bombings.50  The 
unrelenting pressure applied by Det 88 and “large numbers of Muslim casualties” that 
resulted from Bali 2002, Jakarta 2003, 2004, and the Bali 2005 attacks only intensified 
their apprehension.51  
The unresolved debate between Hambali and his pro-violence followers and 
Mantiqi II leaders led some experts to conclude that JI split into two factions that shared 
the idea of violent jihad but were on separate paths to Islamizing the region. This 
interpretation supports the idea that JI became less coherent, but it assumes the two 
competed from the same pool of resources instead of evolving their structure and tactics 
in ways that both factions could use in concert. The relationship between traditionalists 
and pro-violence elements remained unclear, but the description that JI had split became 
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the leading interpretation of how JI has changed over time. Admittedly, traditionalists 
publically distanced themselves from JI’s bombings, but pro-violence attacks had links to 
traditionalists.52 In nearly every one of JI’s major bombings, evidence shows bombing 
operatives sought and received safe-haven and logistical support from traditionalists. If 
these factions are two halves of a whole, traditionalists and their rhetorical condemnation 
of pro-violence activities could be described as an organizational and tactical shift, 
whereby traditionalists secretly execute administrative functions in support of pro-
violence operations.  
Developments beginning in late 2003 showed JI’s organization was changing, but 
at the same time their separate efforts demonstrated JI’s divisions remained cohesive. 
Leaders fell into traditionalist or pro-violence camps and their operations reflected 
different responsibilities. Traditionalists embraced administrative responsibilities. They 
rebuilt the organization both in and outside of Java in areas where communal conflicts 
had taken place previously, and they moved some of their operations and rekindled 
relationships in areas where they had regional partners in the past.53 They focused on 
religious outreach or dakwah in order to regenerate the network with new recruits and 
resources. Moreover, traditionalists engaged in charity, social work, and new business 
ventures. Since 2004, traditionalists have been involved in “the provision of social 
services…to include fundraising, social-welfare activities, humanitarian relief and 
religious outreach.”54 They also became heavily involved in jihadi propaganda as a way 
to both propagate their message and generate funds.55 These adaptations allowed 
                                                 
52 Zachary Abuza, “Making Sense of the Jakarta Bombings: The Shades of Grey,” Counterterrorism 
Blog, accessed May 13, 2010,  
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/07/making_sense_of_the_jakarta_bo.php; Chalk et al., The Evolving 
Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 91, 95-96, 99; Noor Huda Ismail and Carl Ungerer, 
“Jemaah Islamiyah: A renewed struggle?,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute (July 2009), 2; and 
Pavlova, “From a Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI,” 
779. 
53 Abuza, “Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward,” 7; Chalk et al., The Evolving 
Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 93, 96-97, 100; and Jones, “The Changing Nature of 
Jemaah Islamiyah,” 175. Traditionalists’ recruited new members, developed resources, and worked with 
the Muslim public. 
54 Abuza, “Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward,” 8; and Abuza, “The State of 
Jemaah Islamiyah: Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia Five Years After Bali,” 4. 
55 Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 102. 
 15
traditionalists to recruit new members, acquire much needed financial resources and 
reconfigure the network to best achieve its goals.56 These major changes illustrate JI’s 
intent to survive and describe the traditionalists’ administrative role. 
Pro-violence operatives continued to carry out bombing attacks symbolic of JI’s 
struggle against the Indonesian government and its Western supporters.57 Top and 
Azahari masterminded suicide car bombings in 2003 and 2004, then shifted tactics from 
car bombs to backpack bombs for their 2005 and 2009 attacks.58 Their operatives 
received safe haven and logistical support from traditionalist circles, which allowed them 
to successfully carry out these attacks.59  
From late 2004 to 2008, SEA governments applied more pressure to pro-violence 
elements. In late 2005, Dr. Azahari was killed and dozens of bombs were seized in 
multiple CT raids, setting JI terrorist operations back significantly.60 Leadership gaps 
developed, but the JI network and its binding ties remained. Since 2006, traditionalists 
have prioritized on expanding the network and their activities while pro-violence 
elements tried to recover and adjust their operations and tactics based on what was lost 
between 2005 and 2008. 
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Most evidence clearly shows that during this time period, JI evolved into two 
separate factions: the traditionalists and pro-violence militants.61 However, the evidence 
also shows the relationship between JI divisions deserves fresh interpretation. On the one 
hand, traditionalists became a movement that operated openly and increasingly non-
violently because it was difficult for the government to pressure civic society groups that 
did not have concrete links to violence.62 Pro-violence elements operated autonomously, 
but as the author has shown, some evidence indicates they relied on traditionalists for 
support.63 Despite Indonesia’s efforts during this period, and the possibility of a divided 
JI, on July 17, 2009, JI carried out suicide bombings on Western hotels in downtown 
Jakarta.64 Noordin Top, the leader of JI’s pro-violence faction who claimed responsibility 
for the attack, sought personnel, resources, and safe-haven from traditionalists, thus 
suggesting there was some degree of cooperation between the factions.65 
5. Jakarta 2009 to Present 
Indonesia responded to the July 2009 suicide bombings with an iron fist. Det 88 
hunted down and killed Noordin Top and captured or killed several members of JI’s pro-
violence division, effectively crippling his cell.66 Traditionalists openly condemned the 
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attack but not Top and his faction. Remaining pro-violence elements witnessed Det 88 
effectively take down close to an entire suicide-bombing cell. The aftermath of Jakarta 
2009 appears to have influenced a third change. JI leaders—Ba’asyir and Dulmatin— 
consolidated parts of JI’s structure and tactics within the jihadi movement construct so 
they could better advance towards their goals. 
JI’s traditionalist/pro-violence split allowed Top to carry out the Jakarta bombing 
with little impact on traditionalist activity, but it also led to his cell’s neutralization. Thus, 
pro-violence operatives evolved in order to survive and conduct more terrorist attacks, 
and traditionalists focused their activities on recruitment, indoctrination, resource 
generation and military training. Pro-violence leaders looked to have temporarily shelved 
suicide bombing since Jakarta 2009. Abu Rusdan, a Mantiqi II leader who assumed the 
amirship following Ba’asyir’s arrest until his detainment and subsequent release in 2005, 
and Ba’asyir released from prison in 2006— both believed to be leading traditionalists— 
openly condoned jihad but condemned the Jakarta bombings as “misguided” to avoid 
being investigated for links to terrorism.67  
Little is known of traditionalist activity currently, but evidence of Ba’asyir and 
Dulmatin’s initiatives surfaced in early 2010. A paramilitary training camp was 
discovered on Aceh, and preliminary investigations strongly indicate the Aceh camp was 
the base of the AQA terrorist coalition led by JI senior operational leader Dulmatin.68 
Dulmatin, a well respected JI commander, master bomb maker and guerilla warfare 
expert, was brought back to lead JI’s violent operations. His expertise and well-
established connections with other jihadi organizations are evidence of some JI leaders’ 
desires to bolster the JI network and make the best use of its capabilities to carry out 
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some form of terrorism. Members of Top’s crew who remain at large have been linked to 
the Aceh camp along with other members of regional jihadi groups.69 Additionally, 
individuals arrested in connection with Top and the 2009 bombings and the Aceh camp 
have been linked to a radical Islamist group called Jemaah Anshorut Tawhid (JAT), 
founded and led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, a man to whom some traditionalists are still 
fiercely loyal.70 This evidence demonstrates that some traditionalists are recruiting, 
indoctrinating, and providing logistical and financial support to JI’s terrorist activities. 
Ba’asyir denies any ties to the camp on Aceh, and he still denies the existence of JI. 
However, on August 9, 2010, Indonesian authorities arrested Ba’asyir and have evidence 
that Ba’asyir’s JAT financed the AQA coalition camp and was personally involved in the 
planning of AQA’s terrorist operations, thus compromising the integrity of his 
statements.71  
At the very least, the intelligence gleaned from the raids on AQA’s camp and 
subsequent investigations hint at how traditionalist and pro-violence leaders remain 
connected and how they are driving changes in JI’s organization and tactics. Some 
preliminary evidence indicates AQA’s camp was “a new coalition…that rejected both 
JI…and the more violent splinter group led until his death in 2009 by Noordin Top.”72 It 
is known that Top’s pro-bombing faction was linked to the camp, and investigations 
strongly suggest JI operational commander Dulmatin led AQA and was backed by 
Ba’asyir and his JAT organization. Not surprisingly, AQA’s approach mirrors 
traditionalist rhetoric, but promises near-term action through guerilla ambushes and 
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attacks on Indonesian authorities. AQA agrees with traditionalist-supported dakwah but 
views traditionalist rhetoric as insufficient.73 Experts are not quick to tie the camp to 
traditionalists because traditionalists claim Indonesia is not ready for violent jihad.74 In 
any case, some JI leaders have evolved their tactics, and traditionalists led by Ba’asyir 
appear to be supporting these efforts in various capacities. AQA’s rejection of 
traditionalists suggests overt separation between traditionalists and pro-violence 
elements, which further supports alternative interpretations that JI’s evolution has kept 
traditionalist activities from being linked to terrorism.75  
Investigations into Ba’asyir’s JAT and Dulmatin’s AQA coalition reveal both 
groups have alumnus from traditionalist-led schools and that AQA’s leaders were 
teaching classic guerilla tactics: assassinations and coordinated, precision small arms 
attacks. Potential targets include both Indonesian and U.S./Western government officials, 
including one exposed plan to assassinate the president of Indonesia.76 These types of 
guerrilla tactics, if planned right, will be much more difficult to counter. Discoveries of 
AQA’s makeup indicate the coalition is not solely JI, but both traditionalist and pro-
violence member involvement in the coalition strongly suggests that JAT and AQA were 
Ba’asyir and Dulmatin’s response to Indonesia’s CT efforts. Additionally, it was their 
attempt to consolidate JI’s divisions, change their tactics, and become a more capable and 
dangerous threat to Indonesian and U.S. interests. 
To summarize, this literature review has briefly presented the current state of 
knowledge on how terrorist groups evolve, and why analyzing ideology, leadership, 
organizational structure, and operations and tactics is an effective way of describing how 
a terrorist organization evolves. It also described JI’s foundational development and 
briefly showed how JI has evolved over three distinct periods of time in response to the 
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various reactions and pressures of Southeast Asian authorities and the Muslim public 
throughout the region. It captures the two competing interpretations that describe how JI 
has changed over time.  
The first interpretation is that JI has evolved into two deeply divided factions: 
traditionalists and pro-violence. The alternative interpretation is that JI evolved into two 
mutually supportive factions closely connected through their shared ideology. The author 
suggests that within JI there has developed a division of responsibilities in which the 
traditionalists carry out JI’s spiritual, administrative and logistical responsibilities and 
advance the long-term strategy of the group. Traditionalists “germinate and melt 
away…take cover in various legitimate religious activities…camouflage its activities 
behind the cloak of Islamic practices.”77 Traditionalists blend terrorism and Islam 
together, with the former masked by the latter, which both allow for increased 
membership numbers and a more difficult problem to isolate: an image of combating 
terrorism only, not Islam.78 Traditionalists and their condemnation of bombing attacks 
help create a perception that they are no longer directly linked to terrorist activity. 
Propagation of JI’s ideology, espoused by traditionalists, helps create “angry, highly 
motivated, and highly trained individuals” who are prepared to go to any lengths to 
achieve the strategic goal.79 Traditionalists surreptitiously support the attack operations 
of pro-violence elements by providing access to funding, equipment, highly trained 
personnel and safe-haven as investigations into Top’s network and attacks demonstrate.80 
Moreover, recent inquiries into the composition of JAT and AQA reveal close 
relationships between traditionalists and pro-violence leaders persist.81  
Having evolved into this seemingly divided organization, JI faction leaders can 
continue to build a network of jihadists for the long-term and carry out attacks against 
U.S. and Indonesian interests today. It appears Ba’asyir and Dulmatin’s JAT and AQA, 
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which incorporate traditionalist and pro-violence elements, were an attempt to adapt to 
bring JI’s factions closer and bolster their capabilities by forming a coalition with other 
jihadi organizations. The author's alternative description of how JI has evolved 
demonstrates JI leaders are fighting not only for JI’s survival but also for adaptation into 
a new and more dangerous threat. With the alternative interpretation in mind, the author 
will more thoroughly describe how JI has evolved, present the nature of the JI threat 
today, and further consider the possibility that JI is far more connected than divided. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a case study of JI over the past two decades. JI’s ideology, 
leadership, organizational structure, and operations and tactics are examined over the 
course of three time periods over the last two decades: (1) from its inception in 1993 to 
the 2002 Bali bombing; (2) from the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombing to the 2009 
Jakarta hotel bombing; and (3) from the aftermath of that attack until the present. These 
time periods were chosen because they each represent a time period in which JI members 
acted, others responded to JI’s actions, and JI leaders drove the organization to evolve in 
response to others’ reactions to JI’s own actions. 
To tackle the complex issue of interpreting how JI has evolved the author has 
identified and described the factors of ideology, leadership, organizational structure, and 
operations and tactics because they best capture how JI has changed over time and could 
help analysts interpret how other terrorist groups have evolved.82 The author focused his 
observations on the above criteria during each time period, emphasizing how they 
illustrate changes in JI and how JI’s leaders have made the most of them collectively. The 
author focused on these factors because they are the “organizational and operational 
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resources…that sustain groups…and allow terrorists to sustain attack campaigns.”83 If 
one is to show that traditionalists and pro-violence elements have remained cohesive over 
time, one must illustrate not only how JI has changed over time, but also how leaders and 
members of JI still share their ideology and support one another’s operations and tactics. 
This approach uncovered how JI has actually changed and hints at why JI has 
remained a substantial threat to U.S. and Indonesian interests. This will help the United 
States and Indonesia to understand JI and their ongoing war with JI, and it will assist 
audiences “interested in the dynamic threat of terrorism.”84   
The three periods analyzed as discussed in the author's methodology are not all 
equally covered in the scholarly literature. Analyses from the first two periods were 
drawn primarily from the secondary reviewed literature. To account for the third and 
most recent period, this thesis drew on the extensive reporting by mass media on JI, 
especially with respect to recent developments, since few scholarly analyses have been 
published.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This chapter outlined the major research question, its importance, the analytical 
problems to be tackled and the author's preliminary hypothesis, literature review, 
methodology, and thesis overview. As should now be understood, there is room to 
reinterpret JI because it has evolved in ways that analysts have not completely accounted 
for. Based on recent events and investigations, a clear understanding of JI’s evolution and 
the current nature of the JI threat are warranted.  
Chapter II establishes the foundational understanding of JI from its inception up 
through the Bali bombings in 2002. It describes the formation and development of JI’s 
ideology, leadership, organizational structure, and operations and tactics leading up to 
JI’s first successful major terrorist attack and the reactions to it. The importance of this 
chapter is that it shows how JI became a coherent organization. Following the Bali 
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bombings, the Indonesian public and various states from the international community 
applied pressure to JI. JI countered by evolving. Culminating with Bali 2002, the chapter 
summarizes the nature of the initial JI threat. 
Chapter III addresses how JI evolved in response to the variety of pressures 
applied to it following Bali 2002 until 2009. This chapter provides insight into JI’s 
internal division, but it shows how JI acted collectively allowing the group to survive and 
carry out several attacks during this time period. It draws attention to the backlash JI felt 
from the Indonesian public and the CT/law enforcement response from Indonesia/SEA. 
This chapter shows how JI’s leaders organized the group and changed their tactics to 
counter internal and external pressures. The author describes how JI’s ideology provided 
group cohesion and how its leaders changed JI’s structure and expanded their operational 
and tactical repertoire, utilizing them both separately and collectively. It appeared JI 
operatives had carried out their final major terrorist attack with Bali 2005, at least in the 
short-term. Analysts were led to believe the variety of pressures applied to JI members 
had diminished their capacity to carry out attacks. JI pro-violence militants did not carry 
out another suicide bombing until July 2009. This chapter ends with a summary of JI’s 
evolution up through the Jakarta bombing in 2009 and compares it with the JI threat in 
2002. 
Chapter IV examines the period of JI’s evolution following the Jakarta 2009 
suicide bombings up to the present. It identifies and describes how some JI leaders have 
evolved the organization further in response to the external and internal pressures JI 
members have felt for nearly a decade. This chapter concludes with a summary of the 
threat JI members pose at present and compares it with the JI threat described in the 
previous periods discussed. This final description will provide a clearer understanding of 
the nature of the JI threat today.  
The final chapter reviews the author's observations and highlights how his 
analysis bolsters the accuracy of alternative interpretations of how JI has evolved. It 
identifies key implications of the author's findings about JI for Indonesian and U.S. 
policy toward JI and toward terrorism more broadly. By addressing the main problems in 
the above fashion, the author will have contributed to the conventional wisdom because 
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he will have effectively described how JI has changed and how JI’s ideology, which 
ultimately provided group cohesion, allowed JI’s leaders to make shifts in JI’s 
organization and tactics. These changes have led to new threats that require improved 
responses. 
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II. BECOMING SOUTHEAST ASIA’S DEADLIEST TERRORIST 
NETWORK  
A. INTRODUCTION 
On October 12, 2002, JI operatives carried out large-scale suicide bombing 
attacks on the Indonesian island of Bali. These bombings caused mass casualties “at two 
nightclubs in the Kuta section of Bali…At the same time, another bomb was detonated 
near the U.S. consulate in Sanur, Bali.”85 At least two bombs were detonated near bars 
and nightclubs where many Western tourists were known to congregate. JI’s field 
coordinator for the attack employed suicide bombers and multiple detonators to ensure 
the bombs would do their job. The third bomb, which went off at a street curb outside the 
U.S. consulate, was a message to ensure that the United States and Westerners knew the 
attack was against them.86 The bombings killed 202 people and wounded several 
hundred. This attack showed that some of JI’s core—led by Hambali— were determined 
to carry out terrorist attacks as the quintessential means to establish a caliphate in 
Southeast Asia. Their attack aimed at undermining both Indonesian and Western 
governments and echoed the actions of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda by hitting targets 
perceived by jihadists as corrupt to Islamic ideals.87 Now referred to as Bali 2002, this 
attack was “JI’s most destructive bombing to date,” and led analysts to believe a group 
like al-Qaeda was bent on waging violent jihad in Southeast Asia.88 
Terrorist groups do not just appear out of thin air though. All terrorist groups have 
a beginning— a period of time—in which a group engages in activities that allow it to 
become a cohesive organization and carry out successful terrorist attacks.89 Terrorist 
groups establish their system of beliefs, develop a cadre of core leaders, set up an 
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organizational structure with functional requirements, and build a foundation of 
operations and tactics so that they are capable of carrying out their plans and advancing 
towards their goals. JI, like other terrorist groups, experienced this period of 
development, and it allowed JI’s leaders to develop the organization into the largest and 
deadliest terrorist network in Southeast Asia. 
This chapter describes JI’s developmental path from its inception up through the 
Bali bombings in 2002. More importantly, the purpose of this chapter is to establish a 
foundational understanding of the group. The chapter examines the formation of JI’s 
ideology, leadership, organizational structure, and operations and tactics—the key factors 
the author perceives—that allowed JI to become the “largest and most sophisticated 
terrorist network in Southeast Asia” as demonstrated in Bali 2002.90 Of note, Bali 2002 
was not JI’s first major attack attempt. JI’s formative years experienced both successes 
and setbacks. By examining JI’s ideology, organizational structure, and operations and 
tactics and how JI’s leaders applied them to execute attacks—both accomplished and 
thwarted— one also begins to glean insights on JI members’ ability to learn and how JI’s 
subsequent evolution unfolded. This chapter is important because if one is to understand 
how JI has changed over time, then a clear picture must be painted of how JI developed 
into the effective, dangerous terrorist organization it was in 2002. Culminating with Bali 
2002, this chapter concludes having clearly described the nature of the JI threat at that 
time.  
The author argues that during this time period, JI’s members became an 
organized, coherent, and dedicated terrorist group whose leaders largely felt that carrying 
out al-Qaeda style attacks would allow them to begin setting the conditions necessary to 
establish a SEA caliphate. He also argues that JI members early on demonstrated an 
aptitude to learn from their mistakes so that they could evolve into a more effective 
organization and continue to carry out high-profile bombings against Indonesian and 
Western interests. After serious losses in personnel and resources, JI members were able 
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to adapt to their environment and operate collectively. As such, JI operatives carried out 
the Bali suicide bombings in 2002. These bombings confirmed JI was the most serious, 
lethal threat to U.S., Indonesia, and SEA nations in the region.   
B. IDEOLOGY 
If the author is to understand the nature of JI, he must be able to describe what 
inspires and unites JI members and what they aim to achieve. He must describe JI’s 
ideology.91 All terrorist groups form from ideas. From these ideas, group leaders form 
ideologies. A terrorist group’s ideology establishes its purpose. More specifically, 
ideology encapsulates all beliefs, principles, aims and goals, and conceptualizes them to 
the organization in captivating and powerful ways. Inspired by the ideology espoused by 
their leaders, a motivated, connected movement will then take the steps necessary to 
advance towards its goals. 92 In JI’s case, two Indonesian nationals, Abdullah Sungkar 
and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, both committed to Darul Islam’s (DI) idea of an Islamic state of 
Indonesia, and inspired by their experiences during the Anti-Soviet War in the late 1980s 
broke off from DI and founded JI in 1993. Subsequently, Sungkar and Ba’asyir 
developed an ideology that they would use to inspire JI members to develop an 
organization and operations and tactics centered around preparing for and carrying out 
violent jihad to establish a SEA Islamic state.93 
DI and the anti-Western ideals of pan-Arab radical Islam and al-Qaeda inspired 
Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and their followers to create JI’s ideology, which is both religious and 
political in nature. They initially drew from DI’s vision to create an Islamic state of 
Indonesia, but their ideology also paralleled al-Qaeda’s larger global caliphate ideology. 
Because JI’s ideology is regional in scope, it falls somewhere between DI and al-Qaeda. 
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JI’s ideology proclaims Southeast Asia should be an Islamic state with Indonesia as its 
nucleus. “It is espoused as both a divinely justified and obligatory mission” and 
advocates the “transformation of society and politics, by whatever means, into an 
absolute theocracy” guided only by strict interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith.94 It 
espouses violent jihad against “non-Muslims, Muslim apostates and other anti-Islamic 
forces that seek to destroy Islam,” and enforces all Muslims to live life under strict 
Shari'a (Islamic law) as the quintessential means to support this end.95 How JI members 
achieve this end is described clearly in JI’s manifesto, namely the PUPJI.96 
Understanding that these factors together formed JI’s ideology, this section examines the 
influence of DI, al-Qaeda and the mujahidin experience, and describes the end product, 
which is JI’s ideological doctrine. These three major points in the development of JI’s 
ideology allowed Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and their followers to take the necessary steps 
towards establishing a network capable of carrying out terrorist attacks. 
1. JI’s Origins and History - The Influence of Darul Islam 
As early as the 1970s, nearly twenty years before they founded JI, DI members 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir had already begun developing an ideology that expanded on the 
beliefs, principles, and purpose of DI. DI was a radical Islamist group that rebelled 
against the policies of the new Indonesian central government in an effort to establish an 
Islamic state in Indonesia. The movement had some momentum during the 1950s, but it 
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put down the DI rebellion in the 1960s, but the movement resurfaced in the next decade 
only to be betrayed by the government, further fueling the anger of radical Islamists all 
over Indonesia.97 
The DI movement began as a local militia in west Java and a support node to the 
Indonesian nationalist movement in the 1950s. Unhappy with the moderate direction the 
nationalist movement took, some DI leaders broke off from the nationalists and became 
the Islamic Army of Indonesia (TII). Shortly thereafter, DI established an Islamic state of 
Indonesia on west Java. During the 1950s and 1960s, TII fought a jihad against the 
Indonesian military (TNI) and the Indonesian state’s secular policies. After over a decade 
of struggle, the rebellion was put down, but was later revived ostensibly with government 
agency persuasion to support Indonesia’s national efforts to battle communist 
encroachment. When DI fighters came out of hiding to face the communists, Indonesian 
military units arrested them. This betrayal turned many Islamists against the central 
government. At the same time, events like the Iranian Revolution and the proliferation of 
the scholarship of the Muslim Brotherhood were occurring. These events further fueled 
radical Islam’s resentment for secular government throughout the 1970s. Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir, both purportedly DI members, wanted the jihad for an Islamic state of 
Indonesia to carry on. They felt betrayed by the Indonesian government and wanted 
Shari’a and the widespread rejection of the Indonesian government to prevail.98 Many  
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radical Islamist groups would adopt this stance, but the DI offshoot that would come to 
represent the greatest threat to Indonesia and Southeast Asia would be Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir’s JI. 
2. The Influence of al-Qaeda and the Mujahidin Experience 
By the mid-1980s, the idea of expanding DI’s Islamic state of Indonesia into a 
SEA caliphate was little more than a vision of Sungkar and Ba’asyir, but their exile to 
Malaysia and exposure to the Anti-Soviet War soon changed that. Suharto’s crackdown 
on radical Islam in the late 1970s and early 1980s forced Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and other 
Indonesian Islamists to flee to Malaysia where they could freely preach radical Islam. 
The pair was still dedicated to DI, but while exiled they were exposed to pan-Arab radical 
Islam and were captivated by the Mujahidin War being fought in Central Asia.99 This 
exposure influenced Sungkar, Ba’asyir and their small, dedicated following. Islamist 
groups met and discussed the righteousness and obligation of jihad to restore the 
caliphate. These discussions led to Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s vision of a caliphate in SEA 
won through widespread, violent jihad. Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and their following craved 
exposure to jihad, so they made their way up to Central Asia to fight alongside the 
mujahidin.100  
The effects of this exposure on the founders and leaders of JI were heavy. The 
leadership of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s ideologues, as well as the perceived 
success of the mujahidin and al-Qaeda inspired Sungkar, Ba’asyir and their Indonesian 
jihadists.101 They looked to emulate al-Qaeda and probably “inclined them to believe that 
terrorist actions such as bombings and assassinations carried strong religious sanction and 
represented an obligation for Muslims.”102 They began to consider a new jihad of their 
own back in Indonesia and embedded the ideology, organizational structure, training, 
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operations and tactics they saw in Afghanistan into their own vision.103 Al-Qaeda’s 
success emboldened “JI leaders of the righteousness of their own cause.”104 Debate exists 
over how close al-Qaeda’s leaders and JI’s founders became, but the similarities analysts 
have captured between al-Qaeda and what became JI are remarkable. The training, 
experience, and inspiration future JI members received from al-Qaeda must be 
considered.105 Experts characterize JI’s ideology as “very much in line with the thinking 
of the al-Qaeda leadership and yet thoroughly Indonesian.”106 Sungkar and Ba’asyir were 
committed to bring about a SEA Islamic state, and violent jihad was the quintessential 
means to accomplish it. 
Slowly, the Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s jihadists left Central Asia energized and ready 
to wage their own jihad. In 1993, Sungkar and Ba’asyir broke off from DI and officially 
formed JI.107 Between 1993 and 1998, JI’s founders and the men they had chosen to lead 
JI continued to meet and develop JI’s ideology. During this time, JI’s leaders expanded 
their vision into organizational, operational and tactical preparation for violent jihad to 
achieve their objectives. After Suharto resigned in 1998, Sungkar and Ba’asyir rejoined 
many of their inner-circle of Pondok Ngruki/mujahidin veterans in Indonesia, and 
together they preached their new ideology and implemented their vision at their Islamic 
boarding school or pesantren Pondok Ngruki near Solo, Central Java. At the same time, 
JI’s leaders further developed the organizational structure as well as operations and 
tactics of the JI network.108  
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3. The Declaration of the Ideology and Doctrine of JI 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir began with the tenets of DI, fused them with the pan-Arab 
radical Islamist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, the mujahidin and al-Qaeda, and 
from that they created the ideology of JI. Sungkar and Ba’asyir encapsulated JI’s 
ideology as the divine responsibility to carry out jihad to create an Islamic state of 
Indonesia defined by strict adherence to Shari’a law.109 It rejected the ideology and 
constitution of all secular states beginning with Indonesia and promoted the idea that all 
JI members had a responsibility to actively struggle against all forms of  sin, corruption, 
and secular society by any and all means necessary. Discerning interpretation of the 
Qur’an and Hadith supported JI’s ideology. When Indonesia became an Islamic state, 
then JI members would carry out jihad across Southeast Asia and establish a pan-Islamic 
caliphate.110  
JI’s ideology emphasized the need for Muslims to form a group or “jemaah” in 
order to “enforce Islamic law and uphold an Islamic way of life: a precursor to becoming 
an Islamic state.”111 Members of JI took an oath of allegiance and absolute obedience to 
both God and JI spiritual leadership, and dedicated themselves to ridding the world of 
corruption and secular poison as interpreted in the Qur’an and Hadith.112 JI’s ideologues 
purportedly paralleled its ideological guidelines along the same lines that the “Prophet 
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Muhammad himself was reported to have led the early Muslim generation through,” and 
cited preparing for and conducting armed jihad as the means to confront the enemies of 
Islam.113  
In 1996, JI religious ideologues—advisors to Sungkar and Ba’asyir—authored the 
PUPJI, which is a declaration of beliefs, practices and procedures that “provide religious, 
strategic, and tactical instructions on how JI should conduct itself as a mobilizing agent 
for collective action.”114 The PUPJI described what the organization was, what to 
believe, why they should believe it, how to act, and when to collectivize and take action 
against the enemies of their belief system.115 The PUPJI declared JI was part of the 
“Salafi-Jihadist” movement, which supports violent action as part of a divine obligation 
to create a strict Islamic state.116 The PUPJI is heavily embedded with Islamic religious 
text in order to guide and justify group actions under Islamic religious perspective.117 As 
such, it is appropriate to frame the PUPJI as JI’s ideological roadmap: an organizational 
and operational guide for JI leaders to cultivate member behavior backed by Islamic 
religious interpretation in order to attain a pure Islam end state.118 The PUPJI provided 
structured guidelines that framed how JI leaders should establish, develop and prepare the 
JI network and the Muslim community religiously and militarily for violent jihad.119  
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To summarize, two DI members, specifically Sungkar and Ba’asyir, angered by 
the actions of the Indonesian government in the 1970s and 1980s and inspired by pan-
Arab radical Islamism, al-Qaeda and the perceived success of the mujahidin against the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s, expanded upon DI’s vision, developed a dedicated 
following, and formed JI in 1993.120  Their shared beliefs and experiences motivated this 
group to further develop and spread an ideology, establish an organizational structure, 
populate it with members, and develop operations and tactics that would support their 
desire to carry out violent jihad to achieve a SEA caliphate. 
C. LEADERSHIP 
Motivated by the ideology Sungkar and Ba’asyir developed, JI’s first generation 
leaders drove the establishment of the JI network. Tracing the character of Sungkar, 
Ba’asyir and JI’s first-tier leaders offers perspective into the cohesive, coherent nature 
that became JI. As previously shown, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were “charismatic 
individuals who attracted and inspired supporters.”121 However, they needed men they 
could count on to form the far-reaching network required to achieve JI’s objectives. 
Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and the men they shared jihad with in left Central Asia in the early 
1990s were ready to lead JI and build a network capable of large-scale terrorism. 
Together, they formed the foundation of JI’s skilled and motivated core and typified the 
transnational terrorist personality JI formally announced with its 2002 bombings. 
1. Becoming Terrorist Leaders 
Prior to the founding of JI, Sungkar and Ba’asyir already had a history of being 
leaders within the radical Islam movement.122 Twenty years prior to JI’s formation, they 
established a pesantren, on the periphery of Solo called Pondok Ngruki, where they 
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preached radical Islam and formed a “jemaah islamiyah” or Islamic community.123 They 
developed a strong following. In 1978, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were arrested and charged 
with membership in DI and establishment of an Islamic community—as a precursor to an 
Islamic state—and subsequently spent a year in prison. In 1985, after the Indonesian 
Supreme Court upheld the prosecution’s appeal against the two, Sungkar and Ba’asyir, 
facing incarceration again, fled to Malaysia along with several of their disciples.  
While in Malaysia, Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and several “inner circle” Ngruki graduates 
were exposed to Middle Eastern, transnational, jihadi terrorism ideology. Inspired, they 
became involved in the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan.124 First, Sungkar 
travelled to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region where he established a close 
relationship with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s ideologues.125 Then, Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir led their “following of radical Indonesians” to Central Asia so they could get 
exposure to the mujahidin’s jihad.126 Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and their men fought in combat 
and built personal relationships with the mujahidin from the late 1980s through the early 
1990s. Many of these men became members of al-Qaeda.127 They admired Osama bin 
Laden and sought to emulate what bin Laden and his followers accomplished in 
Afghanistan.128  The author emphasizes this experience because it not only shaped 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s unique vision and the trajectory of JI, but it also helps to 
accurately describe how JI’s leaders built their organizational structure, training pipeline, 
and operational and tactical focus. Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and their disciples believed 
following in al-Qaeda’s footsteps would bring JI comparable success. Loyal to Sungkar 
and Ba’asyir, and inspired by the mujahidin, the group slowly returned to Southeast Asia 
in the early 1990s energized to wage their own jihad.129  
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2. JI’s Founders at Work 
When the Suharto regime fell in 1998, Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned to Ngruki 
and reunited with their followers to lead and develop JI.130 Their efforts focused on the 
strategic vision of JI’s ideology and organizational structure.131 Sungkar, who was JI’s 
amir, died of natural causes in 1999, but as Sungkar’s replacement, Ba’asyir continued to 
get JI’s message out. As the remaining founder and spiritual leader of JI, Ba’asyir 
preached and proselytized openly in mosques and Islamic boarding schools about 
Muslims obligation to participate in violent jihad against the un-Islamic Indonesian 
government so that Muslims could reestablish the caliphate.132 At the same time, JI’s 
core leaders established paramilitary cells and more pesantrens, and Ba’asyir and his 
leaders in Indonesia courted the Islamic community to try to expand their support base.  
Emboldened by the political space that had opened up, Ba’asyir established a 
political organization called the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia (MMI) in 2000, which 
was a collection of over 100 “small radical and militant groups from across the 
archipelago,” and ostensibly a “peaceful organization that tried to implement 
Shari’a…through the democratic process.”133 MMI participated in a variety of civil 
society efforts aimed at empowering the Muslim community and undermining the 
policies of the Indonesian government. Several of JI’s operational leaders participated in 
MMI’s efforts. In reality, MMI served as a mobilization mechanism in which JI members 
could network, recruit, extract resources and promote JI’s goals.134 Until his arrest 
following Bali 2002, Ba’asyir inspired JI leaders to develop a far-reaching administrative 
and operational network capable of carrying out large-scale terrorist attacks. Ba’asyir 
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never admitted the existence of JI and claimed he was never a member of al-Qaeda, but 
acknowledged he taught jihadi Islam to many JI members who were arrested over the 
years. Evidence shows Ba’asyir has communicated with other transnational terrorist 
groups and encouraged JI leaders’ efforts to develop the logistics and support capacity 
that could enable the group’s operational elements to plan and execute terrorist attacks 
against U.S. interests.135 
3. JI’s Core Leaders 
JI’s first generation leaders were almost exclusively Ngruki inner-circle and 
mujahidin veterans. Most became disciples of Sungkar and Ba’asyir while at Ngruki in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s or while the two were exiled in Malaysia. During this 
period, JI’s leaders developed their own followings and strong personal loyalties with 
Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and fellow students.136 As mujahidin against the Soviets in the late 
1980s, they became accomplished preachers, expert fighters and military trainers, and 
they developed confidence in these skills based on the perceived success of the 
mujahidin’s victory using the same skill sets.137 Lastly, JI leaders developed strong 
relationships with al-Qaeda and other jihadi organizations while fighting as mujahidin, 
and depended on those relationships to bolster their own efforts at home.138 
 While not an exhaustive list, there are several key JI leaders and their 
relationships with one another are worth describing in order to emphasize the cohesive 
nature of JI’s leadership cadre. The first key JI leader is Hambali, the main bridge 
between al-Qaeda and JI. His membership in both JI and al-Qaeda allowed him to 
develop a strong network in Malaysia and Singapore. He acquired weapons, training, 
finances and logistics, and coordinated operations across Southeast Asia. Ali Gufron was 
a close associate of Hambali and overall operational commander of Bali 2002. Imam 
Samudra was the field coordinator for Bali 2002. Aris Mundanadar is a close companion 
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of Ba’asyir, financier, fluent in Arabic and English, linked to al-Qaeda, and has been 
invaluable to JI’s recruitment. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi was a master bomb maker and 
was JI’s lead field commander in the Philippines until his death. Zulkarnen is JI’s top 
military trainer, leader of JI’s special operations division and remains at large. Abu 
Rusdan is an explosives expert, accomplished preacher, same class of leaders as the Bali 
2002 masterminds, and became amir of JI following Ba’asyir’s arrest until his 
detainment. He still actively supports JI today, yet some evidence shows he does not 
support JI’s anti-Western bombing campaign. Rusdan purportedly leads JI’s traditionalist 
faction. Dulmatin was the architect of several bombings, which include JI’s Christmas 
Eve and Bali 2002 Bombings.139 This is only a partial list of JI leaders. Many more have 
played instrumental roles in the development of a coherent JI network and its evolution. 
The intent is to emphasize that these men and others knew each other well, were loyal to 
one another, JI’s cause, were experts in religion and terrorism, and were committed to 
violent jihad as the only means to restoring the caliphate to Southeast Asia.  
From 1993 to 2000, these men and their closest associates covertly established the 
JI network. They developed a dedicated, well-trained following, and matured their 
relationships with al-Qaeda and other regional terrorist organizations.140 The character of 
this group of individuals is important to describe because it makes clear the nature of JI. 
They viewed al-Qaeda as the cutting edge of the global, radical Islamist movement. 
Loyal to JI’s ideology, these leaders aspired to be the “vanguard group of the Southeast 
Asian jihad” and believed they could accomplish the task as al-Qaeda did in Central 
Asia.141 For seven years, JI leaders dedicated themselves to developing JI’s 
organizational structure. They patiently and quietly recruited members and resources, and 
built up a vast network of terrorist cells that defined the JI network.  
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D. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s ideological vision was ambitious and required a 
mechanism that would allow JI’s leaders to build an administrative and operational 
network capable of carrying out large-scale terrorist attacks.142 The PUPJI defined the 
organizational structure JI leaders employed across Southeast Asia; it was rigid and 
hierarchical in theory. JI’s senior leadership drove the long-term attack tactics, but 
because Sungkar and Ba’asyir envisioned JI operating across over 3,200 miles of 
Southeast Asia collectively, the structure would have to permit some autonomy further 
down the chain.143 The Ngruki inner-circle cultivated and managed the JI network and 
was responsible for combining their individual efforts into JI’s strategic goals. 
Understanding Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and their inner-circle’s exposure to al-Qaeda, it makes 
sense that they developed a structure that in many ways paralleled al-Qaeda’s 
organizational structure.  
1. Defining JI’s Structure and Responsibilities 
JI’s leaders organized the group into a well-defined, hierarchical structure. As 
amir, Sungkar and then Ba’asyir sat at the apex. Beneath the amir were four councils 
responsible for advising the amir and developing JI’s major policies. The most important 
council of the four was the Governing Council because it was run by JI’s Central 
Command and controlled the network’s mantiqis “arranged along geographical 
boundaries.”144 The Central Command had functional component advisors in the areas of 
operations, security, recruitment, finances and communication, and assisted in JI’s 
Central Command’s control of the “networks of militant cells throughout their regions” 
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known as mantiqis.145 Each mantiqi contained districts (wakalah) on down to the cellular 
level (fiah), which carried out the administrative and operational functions required to 
plan and sustain the JI vision of violent jihad.146 Each mantiqi leader established their 
unit in a different part of Southeast Asia and had both common and unique 
responsibilities.  
Evidence shows that beginning in 1996, but perhaps even earlier, mantiqi leaders 
began establishing their units across Southeast Asia. Mantiqi members were encouraged 
to preach jihadi Islam, recruit, indoctrinate and train members for operations, as well as 
establish resource and weapon-generating networks.147 They preached at mosques, 
Islamic boarding schools, and any other public place where they could get access to 
prospective JI members with skills that would help the organization build an efficient 
network. Mantiqi leaders were compelled to look for individuals with military 
experience, technical skills, and those who had both participated in society and been 
alienated by it.148 They also sought out energetic youths interested in the Muslim faith, 
unsure about democracy, and interested in jihad and Shari’a.149 Recruitment was a major 
function across mantiqis.150 Mantiqis recruited a wide variety of Muslims, which 
included members courting their own families.151 Individuals were screened closely, and 
once selected, prospective members were enrolled in a JI pesantren for religious,  
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ideological and military training.152 Indoctrinated recruits often spent time at Ngruki, or 
trained abroad in Afghanistan or the southern Philippines. As such, JI members became 
dedicated assets of the JI network.153  
When the political space opened in 1998, Sungkar, Ba’asyir and Mantiqi II 
leaders launched a major campaign to preach jihad and build a solid base of JI members 
across the Indonesian archipelago.154 Finances and resources appeared to be a major 
priority for JI mantiqis at this time. Inside Indonesia, particularly after the fall of Suharto, 
Ba’asyir and Mantiqi II leaders established ties with sympathetic Indonesian politicians 
and military officers and turned them into resource providers.155 In other parts of 
Southeast Asia, mantiqis worked through several front companies that financed JI 
recruitment and weapons procurement. Some evidence shows JI “almost certainly 
received direct financial support from al-Qaeda, but most fund-raising was conducted 
independently by JI cells.”156  
Mantiqi leaders matured their existing relationships with al-Qaeda and other 
regional terrorist groups in order to build up their networks.157 The space that opened in 
Indonesia and had already existed in other parts of Southeast Asia was recognized by al-
Qaeda. Bin Laden began sending weapons and money to the area. Al-Qaeda extensively 
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terrorist groups allowed JI’s leaders to develop a far-reaching network and operational 
capabilities that paid dividends when JI’s senior leaders decided to transition to the 
execution of terrorist operations.159 
Ba’asyir also worked independently of JI’s covert organizational structure. In 
addition to preaching at Ngruki he worked with the MMI.160 Ba’asyir’s participation in 
the congress gave him the ability to tap into other networks and strengthen JI’s links in 
Indonesia.161 At the same time as Ba’asyir saw his participation in MMI as an 
opportunity to build JI slowly and strategically, younger and more radical JI leaders like 
Hambali, Samudra, and Ali Gufron saw Ba’asyir and Mantiqi II as moving too slowly, 
weakening the integrity of JI, and needing to focus more on violence against Western 
interests.162 One sees this debate develop later in JI’s evolution, but during this time 
period, lack of external pressures allowed JI leaders to avoid conflict over these 
differences, and thus JI’s leaders remained cohesive and coherent. 
2. Mantiqis and Their Responsibilities 
As early as 1996, evidence shows JI had established four mantiqis across 
Southeast Asia. Mantiqi I covered Malaysia and Singapore. Mantiqi II covered most of 
Indonesia, and was the target of JI’s jihad efforts. Mantiqi III covered the Philippines, 
eastern Malaysia, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, and was uniquely suited for training and 
resource gathering. Mantiqi IV was developed for recruitment and resource generation in 
Australia and Papua, but it never really materialized. Hambali, a staunch advocate of 
attacking the West and a member of al-Qaeda, directed the operations of JI’s mantiqis.163 
Inside each mantiqi were districts or wakalah, and within the districts were functional JI 
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cells or fiah.164 Mantiqis were similar to a military structure, with brigades, battalions, 
platoons, and squads respective to mantiqis, districts and cells.165 Until JI’s 
organizational structure consolidated following the foiled Singapore attack in 2001, 
which neutralized much of Mantiqi I, and the subsequent dismantling of much of Mantiqi 
III, JI was tightly structured. Each mantiqi was self-sufficient, but united, loyal to one 
another, and committed to JI’s cause: widespread, violent jihad.166 
 Mantiqi I was the primary conduit between JI and bin Laden/al-Qaeda. Mantiqi I 
leaders moved funds around the region so that mantiqi leaders could send their members 
to Afghanistan or the Philippines for training or weapons procurement.167 Mantiqi I 
leaders planned JI’s first major attack against U.S. interests in Singapore in 2001. The 
attack was foiled prior to the execution date and Singaporean law enforcement 
subsequently uncovered and dismantled JI operations in Singapore, causing its remaining 
members to consolidate with other mantiqis. 
 Mantiqi II was anchored in Indonesia. It began small but grew once Suharto fell 
and Sungkar and Ba’asyir could return to lead JI’s efforts there. Once the operational and 
political space opened up in 1998, Indonesia became JI’s recruitment and operational 
center. When communal conflicts broke out a year later, Sungkar and Ba’asyir deemed 
Indonesia as JI’s main target of jihad efforts.168 With no government crackdown in sight, 
Mantiqi II, with support from Mantiqi I and III, expanded its member base and applied its 
paramilitary skills in a practical environment. With Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s blessings, JI’s 
mantiqi members became increasingly involved in violence. The communal conflicts in 
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debated between members of Mantiqi I and Mantiqi II, were ultimately a collective effort 
and further demonstrated JI leaders’ gradual operational approach towards increasing the 
level of violence against Indonesia.169  
Mantiqi III was a small but important JI node. It was JI’s primary weapons and 
training hub. Mindanao was a key area for training once hostilities in Afghanistan 
cooled.170 Mantiqi III members acquired explosives, guns, and other equipment for the 
other mantiqis. Mantiqi III members worked closely with the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) and ASG in the southern Philippines, which allowed for military training 
and weapons access to mantiqis from several regions. Mantiqi III leaders and the MILF 
had a mutually supportive relationship. Mantiqi III leaders opened doors for the MILF 
into al-Qaeda training, and in turn, the MILF provided JI operatives with large amounts 
of explosives.171 The importance of the southern Philippines to JI must be emphasized 
because even today, the JI network remains embedded in the southern Philippines.172  
Mantiqis both collectively and individually ran their own operations and ensured 
their efforts contributed to JI’s overarching goals. Policies, operations, and alliances with 
other organizations were all subject to the field commander’s discretion.173 The mantiqis 
and their various cells were extensive, autonomous and capable of sustaining operations 
even after the loss of members or dismantling of cells. Mantiqi leaders developed field 
coordinators who ran wakalahs, responsible for delivering money, explosives and for 
developing functional cells, with some in charge of intelligence activities and others who 
might carry out an attack.174 Rank and file field operators had the most responsibility and 
risked their lives to build and deliver the bombs, but had the least understanding of the 
organization.175 Mantiqi leaders understood how to compartmentalize at the district level 
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and below. Mantiqis worked with other like-minded groups in order to advance their 
aims. They generated their own resources or acquired them from other mantiqis, and 
could facilitate their delivery down to the district and cell level, thus illustrating JI’s 
cohesive, coherent administrative/operational nature and collective commitment to JI’s 
goals.176 The investigations of the Christmas Eve bombings in 2000 further demonstrate 
this point. Mantiqis developed sophisticated networks across the archipelago that allowed 
them to generate funds, acquire members and equipment, and protect the integrity of the 
mission by compartmentalizing its various facets. This highly functioning network 
carried out multiple, near-simultaneous attacks across several islands without threatening 
the nature of the organization as a whole.177  
In short, the structure developed and employed by JI leaders from the time JI was 
founded up through 2001, when regional authorities became informed of JI’s existence 
and started dismantling JI cells, was efficient. It permitted the successful development of 
a well populated, financially, religiously and operationally sound network across 
Southeast Asia. JI’s organizational structure, similar to al-Qaeda’s functional structure, 
enabled its members to train and prepare for high-profile terrorist attacks.178 Having 
examined JI’s ideology, leadership and organizational structure, it is now important to 
explore the operations and tactics that JI operatives used to become Southeast Asia’s 
most deadly terrorist organization.  
E. OPERATIONS AND TACTICS 
The operations and tactics developed between 1993 and 2002 made clear JI 
leaders’ terrorist aspirations. As noted, Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and JI’s first generation 
leaders invested in building a rigid organizational structure, a multi-regional network, and 
populating the network with members, but that was not all. JI’s leaders incorporated an 
aggressive training program to prepare their members for jihad. In the late 1990s, JI 
members participated in communal conflicts that broke out in parts of Indonesia. In late 
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2000, JI operatives successfully carried out the group’s first terrorist attacks on Christmas 
Eve 2000. JI and al-Qaeda elements planned major attacks against hardened targets in 
Singapore in 2001, but Singaporean and Malaysian authorities thwarted the attacks. 
Rattled by the dismantling of several JI cells, Hambali, still hoping to bring an al-Qaeda-
style attack to Indonesia, shifted JI’s target choice to soft, largely unguarded targets. On 
October 12, 2002, JI’s Bali cell successfully carried out suicide bombing attacks against 
Western hotels in Bali. For analysts, this attack brought JI’s operational and tactical 
nature into sharp focus. 
1. Training 
Training was integral to JI’s operational development into a proficient terrorist 
group. Religious education and indoctrination into JI’s ideology was built into all levels 
of training. It provided JI members with the enthusiasm and conviction—backed with 
fiery Qur’anic interpretation—required to ensure JI members would carry out terrorist 
operations without hesitation.179 JI leaders taught their members that violent jihad was 
the quintessential means to carry out their obligation to the creation of the caliphate.180  
Many JI rank and file had no military expertise, so JI leaders built an army of 
guerilla fighters and terrorists. Mantiqis, through their close ties with al-Qaeda and other 
regional terrorist groups, established dozens of small training camps throughout 
Indonesia, the southern Philippines and Central Asia, and they grew a broad network of 
competent fighters.181 Mantiqi leaders, most of which had fought in Afghanistan, were 
experts in both using and procuring explosives, chemicals, and detonators. They taught 
these skills along with small arms, infantry tactics, and guerilla warfare.182 Up through 
the onset of U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, mantiqi leaders 
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sent their members to Afghanistan for inspiration— to see what a real Islamic state 
looked like. While abroad, JI operatives further honed their military training.183 The 
training pipeline JI leaders created established a vast network of inspired, well-rounded 
guerilla fighters and terrorists.  
Mantiqi leaders also trained their members to operate clandestinely. They were 
taught about compartmentalization, intelligence, and operational security.184 They were 
also taught to deny the existence of JI and its activities.185 JI members were taught to 
trust other JI members and their familial ties only. This mechanism was put in place to 
ensure group secrecy, and so that JI’s ideology would continue to be passed on from 
generation to generation.186 Most JI members were activated just prior to attacks being 
carried out. This kept the true nature of the organization protected in case JI members 
were arrested. In many cases, even cell or district heads were unaware of terrorist 
operations being planned or carried out in their area. The district head was only 
responsible for providing resources.  
A small core of JI members sometimes referred to as JI’s special operations 
division was utilized for JI’s terrorist attacks. It kept its “membership limited,” bringing 
in reserves only when necessary.187 Oftentimes, the only concrete ties that linked 
terrorists to JI were Ngruki or another JI pesantren. This practice allowed JI terrorist cells 
to develop attack plans independently, which permitted operatives to carry out multiple, 
near-simultaneous attacks without threatening the nature of the organization as a 
whole.188 In short, JI’s training program was designed to prepare its members for the  
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full-spectrum of violence in support of JI’s ideology. Its patient and specific training 
agenda taught JI operatives how to build bombs, fight in combat, and organize and 
manage sophisticated attack operations clandestinely.189 
2. JI’s Role in Indonesia’s Communal Conflicts 
In 1999, communal conflicts broke out in Maluku and Central Sulawesi between 
Christians and Muslims. These conflicts were not sparked or led by JI, but many JI 
members participated for several reasons. These conflicts provided JI leaders the 
opportunity to expose their members to operational activity, gain valuable combat 
experience, and recruit Muslims who might be inclined to expand their view of jihad. JI 
members were eager to participate because they were motivated by the idea of exacting 
revenge and creating terror among Christians, but that was not the main incentive of JI 
leaders.190 JI leaders utilized the anti-Christian feelings resulting from the communal 
violence to recruit, establish paramilitary cells, forge deeper relationships with other 
jihadist organizations, and participate in jihad, but more importantly, senior leadership 
saw the communal conflicts as an opportunity to put operational skills to practice.191  
Al-Qaeda leadership shared this vision. As such, they “provided significant 
funding, financial infrastructure, training, and arming of JI militants” which improved 
JI’s sustainment capacity.192 The communal conflicts afforded a number of benefits to JI, 
but applying their training in preparation for future terrorist attacks was what drove JI 
leaders to participate in the communal conflicts.193 At the same time, it is important to 
point out that the communal conflicts also defined the identity of many JI leaders in 
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Indonesia, especially those that had not had exposure to Afghanistan. Many of these JI 
leaders felt more comfortable waging jihad against “domestic political issues like the 
communal conflicts more than on international ones.”194 
3. Christmas Eve Bombings 2000 
Bolstered by al-Qaeda and emboldened by communal conflicts, JI leaders set out 
to lead their own campaign of violence in 2000. JI operatives executed several small, 
confidence-building attacks in 2000 dismissed by authorities as local violence. Later that 
year, operatives carried out sophisticated bombing attacks on Christmas Eve where they 
delivered “more than 30 bombs to churches or priests in eleven Indonesian cities across 
six provinces, all wired to explode around the same time.” Nineteen people were killed 
and over 120 people injured.195 The bombs were small and carried in bags, which 
allowed for a significant amount of control of whom and what would be damaged.196 
This attack was a great opportunity for JI members to execute and learn from a terrorist 
attack.197 The attack also demonstrated JI leaders had developed a far-reaching, well-
trained network capable of carrying out multiple bombings at once, although at the time 
the bombings were not recognized as the work of JI.198 Indonesian authorities wrote the 
attack off as sectarian violence as well. It would not be until Mantiqi I became exposed in 
2001 that the true nature of JI’s network would become apparent.199 Most importantly, 
these attacks provided JI members with practical training and operational experience, and 
had impressed al-Qaeda. This is not to say that JI was subservient to al-Qaeda, rather 
there was a relationship of “mutual advantage and reciprocal assistance.”200 JI leaders  
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and members respected what al-Qaeda had accomplished and saw al-Qaeda-like actions 
paying similar dividends in JI’s own jihad. Moreover, JI’s Christmas Eve bombings 
drove al-Qaeda to finance future JI attack plans. 
4. The Singapore Attack 2001 
It should not be surprising that JI’s first attempt at a major terrorist attack bared 
all the characteristics of an al-Qaeda-style attack. In 2001, Hambali chose to make targets 
in Singapore Mantiqi I’s focus of effort. Hambali gave the order to plan and bomb 
multiple targets, which included the U.S. Embassy, Israeli Embassy, naval facilities in 
Singapore, and other Western interests. JI’s Singapore cell planned for six truck bombs—
a total of seventeen tons of ammonium nitrate—to attack their targets with.201 Al-Qaeda 
provided the bulk of the financing for the operation and was going to supply the suicide 
bombers to carry out the attack. Just prior to the attack date, Singaporean authorities 
foiled the plan. Singaporean authorities arrested several Muslim militants “suspected of 
working with al-Qaeda.” Their interrogations exposed the JI network, the desire of its 
leaders to “focus on Western targets and mass-casualty bombings of public places,” and 
their ties to al-Qaeda.202 The information from these interrogations led to the unraveling 
of JI’s Malaysia and Singapore cells and links to Hambali and Ba’asyir.203 Malaysia and 
Singapore cracked down on JI mantiqis in their countries in late 2001.204 Subsequent 
information led to the arrests of key JI leaders in the Philippines in raids that seized 
sizable amounts of suspected JI military materiel and an outline of key JI operational 
commanders suspected of planning future terrorist attacks.205 Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Philippines eradicated the JI presence in their countries, but Indonesia was not yet 
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following suit.206 Since 2001, much of Mantiqi I and III's ability to operate has been 
constrained.207 Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines investigative efforts exposed JI’s 
complex network and its intent to carry out terrorist attacks.208 Alerted to JI’s presence, 
the operating environment became restrictive but JI’s leaders showed resilience.209 
5. Bali 2002 
Despite losses in late 2001 and early 2002, al-Qaeda encouraged Hambali and his 
followers to move forward with attacks. Some Mantiqi II leaders were reluctant to 
proceed with more attacks, but the group pressed forward. Hambali and his pro-violence 
militants, along with administrative support from Mantiqi II, showed resilience, cohesion, 
and an ability to shift their target selection to accommodate the changing CT 
environment.210 Remaining Mantiqi I leaders underneath Hambali held a “more 
internationalist outlook,” were closer to al-Qaeda, were Afghan-Soviet war veterans, 
demonstrated a willingness to engage in jihad, and wanted to plan another attack against 
Western interests.211 Mantiqi II leaders were domestically focused and committed to JI’s 
ideology, but were reluctant to transition to suicide bombings against targets they did not 
see as direct enemies. They were particularly unsure about al-Qaeda-style attacks against 
Western interests where Muslims could get killed.212 A split emerged, with an internal 
division between al-Qaeda-inspired JI leaders and JI leaders more comfortable supporting 
Indonesia’s sectarian violence.  
 
 
                                                 
206 Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, 161; and Fealy and Borgu, “Local 
Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” 37. 
207 Fealy and Borgu, “Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” 53. 
208 ICG Indonesia Briefing 2002, 2. 
209 ICG Asia Report 43, 1. 
210 Fealy and Borgu, “Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” 34. 
211 Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 170. 
212 Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 170, 174; and ICG Asia Report 74, 1-4.  
 52
Nonetheless, Hambali, loyal to al-Qaeda’s desires, pressed forward and shifted 
JI’s target focus. Hambali determined JI operatives would attack “soft” economic targets 
frequented by Westerners.213 Some evidence states that Ba’asyir and Mantiqi II leaders 
stressed the need to hold off on high-profile attacks because the pressure on JI was 
mounting, and they feared that any attack at that time would do more harm than good.214 
However, that did not stop Hambali’s followers from pressing forward with plans for Bali 
2002. Once they had given their opinion, Ba’asyir and the leaders of Mantiqi II now 
referred to as JI “traditionalists” transitioned their efforts to the “tumultuous events in 
their own country,” where they focused on religious outreach, recruitment, indoctrination 
into JI, and military training.215 Ba’asyir and Mantiqi II leaders were “by no means 
opposed to using violence…but they believed that mass-casualty terrorism would be 
more counterproductive for JI.”216  
This is where the analytical debate originated over changes in JI’s organizational 
structure and differences in opinion over tactics. One interpretation suggests that this 
internal debate led to much less internal cohesion and factions developing, while the 
other interpretation argues that while differences existed, JI leaders and their factions saw 
their separate approaches as “all part of the same struggle.”217  
Despite the internal debate, Hambali, Mantiqi I leaders and to a lesser extent 
Mantiqi III leaders, now referred to as “pro-violence” leaders, pressed forward with plans 
to target Bali.218  Hambali wanted to carry out attacks on U.S. interests and allies, but JI 
operatives would have to attack “soft economic targets,” “small bombings in bars, cafes 
or nightclubs frequented by Westerners in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines 
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and Indonesia.”219 On October 12, 2002, JI elements attacked Bali nightclubs and killed 
over 200 people. The attack was the largest and most sophisticated JI leaders had put 
together, and was the most deadly the region had seen.220 It clearly demonstrated how 
parts of JI had embraced al-Qaeda’s ideology, incorporated it into its own ideology, and 
employed an al-Qaeda-style operation with al-Qaeda tactics. This attack also showed that 
despite its losses, JI leaders could adapt the organization to its environment so members 
could continue to carry out attacks. With the culmination of the Bali 2002 bombing, it 
was clear that JI was largely a cohesive, capable terrorist network inspired to wage 
violent jihad, and it was the formal announcement of JI as the paramount terrorist group 
in Indonesia.221 
F. CONCLUSION 
There was little doubt that after the “devastating triple-suicide Bali attack of 
October 12, 2002, where 202 people perished and another 330 were wounded” analysts 
would coin JI “as Southeast Asia’s largest and most deadly militant Islamist terrorist 
network.”222 Analysts only guessed at what JI’s next move was. What was certain was 
that Indonesia, SEA nations and the West were staring at a coherent, motivated, far-
reaching, highly capable terrorist network whose most charismatic leaders were affiliated 
with and wanted to emulate al-Qaeda, undermine the region’s governments, and establish 
an Islamic state.  
As this chapter demonstrated, JI’s founders and core leaders developed a 
motivating ideology, committed and capable leadership cadre, a functioning 
organizational structure, and through their accomplished training pipeline, developed an 
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operational and tactical capacity to carry out sophisticated, al-Qaeda-style terrorist 
attacks. This chapter showed that despite a changing CT environment and internal 
conflict over the cost/benefit of suicide bombings, the resolute belief in violent jihad to 
achieve their goals saw JI through to Bali 2002. Indeed, JI was capable, committed, and 
coherent enough to carry out Bali 2002, and could likely execute additional attack plans 
against the interests they felt stood in the way of their end state. Analysts surmised the 
success of Bali 2002 had only whetted JI leaders’ appetites to carry out additional mass 
casualty attacks. Southeast Asia and the West had to respond. The aftermath of Bali 2002 
marked the beginning of Southeast Asia’s war on terrorism, and the reactions of the 
governments and the Muslim majority public would spark the evolution of JI.  
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III. ADAPTATION AND EVOLUTION: DIVERSE AND 
DANGEROUS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
JI’s Bali cell demonstrated their organization’s impressive capabilities and the 
intentions of JI’s leaders who advocated an anti-Western jihad attack campaign through 
Bali 2002.223 They carried out a large-scale terrorist attack against Western and 
Indonesian interests—symbols—that represented suppression of their Islamic state ideals. 
The bombings also revealed JI’s ability to evolve, as its members could adapt in order to 
ensure execution of terrorism operations in pursuit of their goals. Bali 2002 was a 
wakeup call to Southeast Asia; a transnational jihadi organization was actively 
threatening the region.  
SEA governments and their Muslim publics responded to JI in a variety of ways 
but primarily with a heavy hand. These responses compelled JI’s leaders to evolve the 
group. JI members learned and adapted so that they could not only survive, but also 
function well, retaining and improving their ability to wage jihad. From October 2002 
through July 2009, SEA governments and their publics answered JI, and JI elements 
countered. SEA government CT crackdowns led to the arrest or death of several hundred 
JI members.224 Muslims, angered by JI’s attacks, gradually withdrew support for the 
organization. Some JI leaders were influenced by these changes and adjusted their 
commands and tactics, while other leaders were undeterred and thus continued to carry 
out terrorist attacks. Despite various changes within JI during this period, JI operatives 
were able to execute four more suicide bombings, which killed dozens and wounded 
hundreds, many of whom were innocent Muslims.225 
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As discussed earlier, if terrorist groups do not “adapt over time into more-
effective organizations,” the distinct possibility exists that they will end.226 JI did not 
end. Its members learned from their experiences and adapted to a new CT and public 
environment. JI leaders drove their members to “develop, improve, and employ new 
skills that enabled them to change their capabilities over time,” which allowed the 
movement to regenerate, expand, and sustain a campaign of terrorist attacks.227  JI 
survived because its members “acted systematically to fulfill their needs, strengthen their 
capabilities, and advance their strategic agenda.”228 In short, JI evolved into a more 
effective organization and increasingly dangerous threat. 
This chapter discusses JI’s evolution post-Bali 2002 to the Jakarta bombings in 
2009. The purpose of this chapter is to describe how JI evolved during this period. The 
chapter identifies, describes and assesses the changes in JI’s ideology, leadership, 
organizational structure, and operations and tactics. Continuity through a shared ideology 
and changes made by leaders in structure as well as operational and tactical 
responsibilities allowed the bulk of the movement to regenerate resources and develop a 
largely non-violent, social service-providing persona. This permitted its members to 
operate more openly because it was difficult for the government to pressure Islamist 
groups that did not have concrete links to terrorism. Moreover, these changes allowed JI 
members to provide clandestine JI militants with administrative support as necessary so 
that JI could “remain the single greatest security threat to Indonesia” and possibly to 
Southeast Asia as well.229 Culminating with the Jakarta bombings in 2009, this chapter 
concludes by having clearly identified and described the key aspects of JI’s evolution and 
the nature of the JI threat at that time. By examining how JI’s ideology, leadership, 
structure, and operations and tactics changed during this period, the author continues to 
improve upon the understanding of the nature of the JI threat. 
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The author argues that despite external and internal pressures, JI’s membership 
largely remained cohesive and evolved into a more complicated and sophisticated 
movement. JI’s core did not deviate from its overarching ideology. Instead, JI’s leaders 
changed the organization’s structure and enhanced their capabilities by adapting and 
expanding their operations and tactics in large part in response to the pressures that were 
impacting JI’s cause. These shifts permitted JI’s leaders to create a more effective 
organization—two divisions—traditionalists and radicals divided by administrative and 
operational functions respectively. Together, they continued to carry out bombings 
against Indonesian and Western interests. They also helped JI leaders rehabilitate JI’s 
damaged reputation and reach. Despite setbacks, JI members carried out major attacks in 
2003, 2004, 2005 and 2009. These bombings, coupled with other dangerous activities, 
reiterate the author’s assessment: JI was and is the most serious, lethal threat to 
Indonesia, SEA nations, and U.S. interests in the region.230 
B. RESPONSES TO JI 
Bali 2002 evoked numerous responses from SEA governments. Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Singapore acknowledged JI as a clear and immediate terrorist threat to 
the region. Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore’s investigative efforts coupled with 
Indonesia’s post-Bali inquiries revealed JI’s sophisticated, multi-regional network and its 
links to al-Qaeda and other jihadi organizations. The region’s intelligence and security 
agencies deduced that over the course of nearly a decade, JI’s leaders had acquired 
resources, personnel, and materiel from all over Southeast Asia and trained their 
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discoveries resulted in concerted initiatives to counter the JI threat. The efforts of 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore led to the capture of key JI leaders and dozens 
of JI operatives, effectively dismantling JI mantiqis in their countries.231   
Reluctant, but no longer denying the existence of a problem, Indonesia had 
launched its own CT campaign by 2003. Indonesia, with help from the United States and 
Australia, developed additional security agencies, most notably Detachment 88, which 
was an elite law enforcement entity designed to execute CT intelligence and operations. 
With a nascent CT apparatus in place, Indonesia launched a crackdown on JI and has 
produced favorable results. Since 2003, Indonesian and other SEA authorities have killed 
or detained between 200 and 450 JI operatives, and their CT raids have consistently 
disrupted JI’s attack operations. Several of JI’s lynchpin leaders were caught or 
neutralized. Moreover, JI senior leadership has had to replace arrested leaders and experts 
at the Central Command as well as mantiqi and wakalah levels, which has resulted in 
episodic leadership vacuums and an inability to coordinate operational and tactical 
guidance across the region.232  
The public responded as well. Bali 2002 and subsequent JI bombings “provoked 
Indonesian public anger and denouncement by political parties including the Muslim 
political parties.”233 The Indonesian government’s transparent, rule-of-law approach to 
the JI threat gradually won the favor of some of Indonesia’s Muslim majority. To 
                                                 
231 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, 7; Chalk et al., The 
Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 87; ICG Asia Report 43, 25; and Jones, 
“The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 170. At Singapore’s request, “JI was formally added to the 
United Nations list of terrorist organizations.” 
232 Abuza “Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward,” 6-7; Abuza, Political Islam and 
Violence in Indonesia, 37; Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, 53; 
Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 94, 99; Conboy, The 
Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network, 196-197, 204-205, 223; Fealy and Borgu, 
“Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” 26, 34; and Jones, “The Changing Nature of 
Jemaah Islamiyah,” 170. Detachment 88 has almost exclusively targeted JI elements. JI's spiritual leader 
and founder Ba'asyir was incarcerated through 2006; Hambali, JI's operations chief and advocate of mass 
casualty attacks against Western targets and a main link to al-Qaeda, was captured in Thailand in 2003; Dr. 
Azahari, JI's top bomb maker, was killed in 2005, just to name a few. 
233 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, 23; Chalk et al., The 
Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, 84-85; Jackson et al., Aptitude for 
Destruction, vol. 2, 82; and Sidney Jones, “Briefing for the New President: The Terrorist Threat in 
Indonesia and Southeast Asia,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
618:1 (2008), 70. 
 59
summarize, government responses weakened JI and were “instrumental in turning public 
opinion against JI.”234 Analysts concluded JI was “damaged but still dangerous.”235 
Despite a generally united commitment to JI’s ideology, ongoing internal debate amongst 
JI’s leaders intensified. Without conceding JI’s principles and goals, JI’s leaders realized 
their structure needed change and new tactics had to be employed.236 JI had to evolve, 
and it did quite creatively and successfully. 
C. JI RESPONDS TO THE PRESSURE 
Prior to the crackdown, JI was a well-resourced, organized, transnational jihadi 
network capable of carrying out simultaneous terrorist attacks. Analysts estimated JI had 
nearly 2,000 operatives and possibly an additional 5,000 affiliated with the group. It had 
strong links with al-Qaeda, DI and several other regional jihadi networks. JI was the 
predominant threat in Southeast Asia, but it had taken a decade in an environment naive 
to its existence to get to that point.237  
Commitment to JI’s ideology drove its leaders and their movement forward. JI 
leaders consolidated and modified their organizational structure and repertoire of 
operations and tactics so that they could reorganize and regenerate the network, and 
continued to conduct activities that would advance their aims. In other words, JI leaders 
adjusted the movement in response to “internal needs, external shocks, and demographic 
changes” and thus became a more effective movement.238 During this time period, JI 
countered with “considerable resilience and capacity to adapt to the changing 
environment,” which allowed it to learn, evolve, and remain the top security threat to the 
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region.239 In summary, JI’s ideology sustained group cohesion and drove its leaders to 
alter JI’s organizational structure and improve its capabilities by expanding and 
enhancing their operations and tactical repertoire. 
1. JI’s Unwavering Ideology 
The JI network remained committed to its ideology: waging jihad to establish an 
Islamic state. This section describes how JI’s ideology survived and how it impacted JI’s 
evolution. JI’s ideology kept the organization united and focused on rebuilding 
capabilities and maintaining the capacity to carry out operations in support of its near and 
long-term goals. The noted changes in leadership, organizational structure, and 
operations and tactics to be discussed later show how JI evolved. Analyzing JI’s ideology 
helps determine the accuracy of descriptions that interpret how JI has managed to remain 
cohesive and coherent, not the fractured state many have described.240 
The fused DI/al-Qaeda ideology developed by JI’s core leaders in the decade prior 
to Bali 2002 had driven the establishment of the regional terrorist network. Their vision 
brought like-minded individuals together from all over Southeast Asia and inspired them 
to dedicate their lives to JI’s goals. Sungkar, Ba’asyir and their inner-circle’s ideology 
justified their intent to wage jihad, and it was manifested in sectarian violence, Christmas 
Eve bombings in 2000, thwarted attacks in 2001, and the triple suicide bombings in Bali 
2002.241  
Ideology was a key aspect of JI’s evolution. It did not change per se, but JI’s 
ideology helped drive the movement to adapt collectively. Throughout this period, JI’s 
ideology kept the organization alive, together, relevant and moving forward. JI members 
“remained firmly rooted in their founding precepts and extremist political vision,” 
resulting in noteworthy cohesion.242 It had inspired and bonded the group initially and 
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JI’s leaders used it to keep the group united and focused. It served as the primary 
recruiting mechanism to regenerate the diminished network. JI’s ideology inspired 
existing members and motivated new ones to work towards the organization’s goals, and 
finally, JI’s jihadi aspirations permitted its membership to forge alliances with other like-
minded jihadists in order to rebuild its capabilities, improve upon them and continue their 
struggle.243 Describing the continuity JI’s ideology provided helps to understand how JI 
evolved so successfully and why it remains a united threat. 
JI’s religiously justified goals sustained a deep sense of loyalty, obedience, 
determination, and cohesion throughout the group. It motivated and empowered its core 
to carry out any activity that supported the aims of the organization. JI’s ideology 
encouraged the continuation of preemptive violence whenever the opportunity presented 
itself, for only through jihad could a “truly Islamic consciousness be brought to 
society.”244 JI’s losses no doubt impacted the movement, but its ideology “carried strong 
religious conviction,” thereby creating a faithful, obligated network who could continue 
to rely on one another.245 JI members did not often deny other members’ requests for 
help, and because of this JI militants like Top who relied on “teachers at JI schools and 
their students, to provide hiding places or logistical aid as needed,” were able to sustain 
their campaign of violence throughout this period despite CT pressure.246  
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JI’s diminished yet dedicated membership was not enough though. The PUPJI 
called for a strong, secure base of people “pious in their devotions” and willing to carry 
out the requirements of the organization.247 JI leaders had to reconstitute a sizable, 
committed, membership/support base and leadership cadre. To regenerate the network, JI 
members preached JI’s ideology “at every opportunity.”248 Analyses of JI’s membership 
strength do not indicate a return to their pre-crackdown numbers. Conservative estimates 
put JI’s numbers at about 900 devoted members as of 2009, compared to well over a 
thousand operatives not to mention hundreds more sympathizers during its peak prior to 
Bali 2002. However, JI’s ideology brought new Muslims into the JI fold, bolstering the 
damaged movement’s numbers and breathing life back into JI’s long-term strategy.249 
In the years since Bali 2002, JI’s leaders have continued to preach their ideology 
in their pesantrens and they established new schools that advocated Shari’a law and 
obligation to jihad. Where there was a predisposition to strict Islam, JI members targeted 
young, pious Muslims and brought them into JI’s support structure. JI’s leaders aimed to 
expand existing and create new, pure Islamic communities. As envisioned, these jemaah 
would later serve as “beachheads” in their struggle and strengthen into the resistance 
needed to establish the caliphate.250 During this period, thousands of students attended JI 
pesantrens, and at least 60 to 100 other pesantrens were suspected of being exposed to 
JI’s ideology. This pool of students likely served as an excellent group of recruits to be 
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and through marriage, which further replenished ranks and reinforced support for the 
movement. JI’s family/kinship network bound teacher, student and blood together, which 
facilitated the evolution that JI’s leaders desired and protected their efforts.252  
JI’s Islamic scholars preached jihad across the Indonesian archipelago. They 
blamed the West and Indonesia’s government for the decay and injustices of Islamic 
society. The narrative appealed to a variety of radical Islam sympathizers and flourished 
in areas where Muslims had existing grievances against the “Islamaphobic” Indonesian 
state.253 DI advocates and proponents of jihad responded by contributing personnel and 
resources to the damaged JI. Simply put, JI’s ideology helped replenish ranks and drum 
up support for the cause by embracing freedom in society.254 
Finally, JI’s ideology allowed it leaders to strengthen existing alliances and foster 
new ties with like-minded organizations. Relying on shared ideologies, JI members 
worked with other Islamist movements to rebuild and improve capabilities and continue 
their jihad. The PUPJI stated alliances could be formed as long they supported JI’s 
principles and goals. As such, JI members formed networks that helped the organization 
to recruit, acquire resources, train, plan, and carry out operations. In short, JI’s ideology 
provided “incentives and opportunities to leverage other militant Islamic groups…to 
enhance its own knowledge and capabilities for undertaking violent acts.”255 It is fair to 
say that JI’s ideology was responsible for the rehabilitation of the “intricate web of 
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kinship, friendship, school, military training, and business ties” that is JI.256 JI’s ideology 
drove its core to survive, recuperate, and carry out violence in spite of an increasingly 
constrained CT environment and wary public.257 
Indeed, JI’s ideology underpinned JI’s evolution. Its message compelled and 
committed its members to the cause. It not only permitted JI to survive, but it drove JI’s 
members to adapt into a more effective organization and remain an equally, if not 
increasingly, dangerous threat. JI’s ideology continued to “frame its organizational 
structure, leadership and membership motivation, recruitment and support, and strategy 
and tactics.”258 JI’s ideology provided continuity, and understanding that helps describe 
an accurate interpretation of how JI evolved. 
2. Leadership Divided?  
Much of accurately determining how JI evolved surfaces through analysis of JI’s 
leadership during this period. Faithful to the struggle but reeling from the effects of 
regional CT efforts, JI’s leaders recognized the organization needed to adapt. Before Bali 
2002, there were signs that JI’s leaders wanted change. Once the Bali cell carried out JI’s 
first attack against a Western target, the repercussions that followed accelerated an 
evolution that had already begun. JI’s leaders had been debating viewpoints that might 
improve JI’s survivability and efforts to advance towards its Islamic state goal. Increasing 
external and internal pressures drove this debate into marked changes. This section 
examines JI’s leaders and their role in JI’s evolution. This section describes the debate 
between JI’s leaders. It goes on to discuss JI’s leaders and their actions up to the Jakarta 
bombings in 2009. JI’s leaders evolved the group in ways analysts still cannot 
conclusively determine, but by breaking down how JI’s leaders adapted, the author 
begins offering new insights regarding JI’s evolution and the nature of the JI threat. 
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JI’s leadership evolution is complicated. It began as an internal debate between 
the core leaders as early as 1999.259 Ba’asyir and many of Mantiqi II’s leaders agreed 
that JI was responsible for the establishment and defense of Islamic communities against 
the injustices of the Indonesian government until their “counter-society” was ready to 
become a “counter-state” movement.260 However, the CT crackdown following JI’s 
Singapore debacle in 2001 compelled JI’s leaders to rethink their tactics. Ba’asyir and 
many Mantiqi II leaders were worried a major anti-Western attack in Indonesia might be 
counterproductive to JI’s grand strategy.261 Yet, Hambali and Mantiqi I leaders following 
his lead were not phased by JI’s losses abroad. The debate over the efficacy of suicide 
bombings against Western targets went unresolved. JI elements, under Hambali’s 
direction, carried out the Bali bombings as planned. Government CT crackdown and 
outrage from the Muslim public followed, intensifying this debate and forcing JI’s 
leaders to make shifts in the organization.262  
The regional crackdown targeted JI’s leadership and its rank and file. Hundreds of 
JI members and much of the group’s leaders were detained or were on the run. Ba’asyir 
left his position as JI’s amir in 2000 to develop the MMI, but he was arrested in 2002 due 
to his purported involvement in JI’s attack operations. Abu Rusdan was elevated to amir 
and occupied the position until his arrest in 2003. Next, Abu Dujana served as amir until 
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he was caught in 2007. Hambali, who was JI’s operational chief, and the vanguard of JI’s 
suicide bombing campaign, was captured in Thailand in 2003. In short, JI’s leaders and 
their commands were under threat throughout this period. JI’s losses were impacting the 
group’s continued ability to function. If JI was to survive the crackdown and remain a 
viable organization, JI’s leaders would have to make changes.263 
Following Bali 2002, JI’s leaders embraced new roles—in line with JI’s 
ideology—for themselves and their commands. Mantiqi II leaders or mainstream JI 
became known as “traditionalists.” 264 They continued to believe in JI’s jihad but claimed 
Bali 2002 was premature and counterproductive. Traditionalists felt JI lacked the capacity 
to carry out counter-state jihad. Violence was still condoned, but traditionalists did not 
want mainstream JI associated with anti-Western suicide bombings. Abu Rusdan was 
quoted as saying “the Bali attacks have hurt the group by bringing its activities and 
operations under the now-constant scrutiny of the police and security authorities.”265 To 
alleviate this pressure, traditionalist leaders ostensibly condemned suicide bombings and 
focused on recruitment, regeneration of resources and capabilities, and the spread of JI’s 
ideology, and they fought where Muslims were directly under attack.266 This response  
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was logical and made strategic sense. Reflecting on the recent damage to their network, 
traditionalist leaders shifted to protecting and rebuilding the network. At the same time, 
new “pro-violence” leaders emerged as well.  
Hambali’s followers embraced new roles in accordance with JI’s ideology. In 
2003, Noordin Top and Dr. Azahari became the leaders of JI’s pro-violence movement. 
Top led the movement, and Azahari—JI’s top bomb-making expert—was Top’s right-
hand man. They felt the Bali bombings and additional attacks against Western interests 
were religiously justified and beneficial to JI’s goals. These two led a division of jihadists 
that participated in sectarian violence, and carried out suicide bombings in 2003, 2004, 
and 2005. Indonesian security forces killed Azahari in a raid in late 2005. The raid also 
seized almost three-dozen suicide vests, which set back Top’s operations considerably. 
Undeterred, Top regrouped. Despite periodic operational disruptions that led to reduced 
attack capabilities from 2006 to 2008, JI operatives led by Top carried out a double 
suicide bombing in Jakarta in 2009. A few months later, Top was killed in a shootout 
with Indonesian CT. Although both groups shared the same ideology, experts concluded 
traditionalist and pro-violence leaders had separated and could no longer be viewed as 
one movement. Top’s bombings were symbolic, but traditionalists purportedly opposed 
them.267 Most analysts believed JI’s leadership schism left the organization as two 
competing factions. 
Interpretations of how JI’s leaders split vary. The first interpretation claims 
internal debate became “less internal cohesion,” then a “deepening rift,” and eventually 
“fracturing and splintering” into two competing factions divided over tactics.268 JI 
traditionalist leaders did not endorse Bali 2002 and did not condone subsequent 
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bombings. Pro-violence militants and traditionalists went their separate ways. 
Traditionalist leaders’ statements like that of Abu Rusdan show this line of thinking 
deserves credit. The lull in attacks after 2005 also supports claims that Top was no longer 
supported by mainstream JI. At the same time, the bombs recovered when Azahari was 
killed in 2005, along with major raids in 2007 and 2008, indicate Top was still getting 
help from mainstream JI. Specifically, Top-led bombings in 2009 had links to JI 
traditionalists. He tapped into traditionalist-affiliated schools for foot soldiers and 
received both logistical support and safe haven from traditionalist members throughout 
the attack planning phases. On the one hand, evidence shows that since 2003-2004, 
traditionalist leaders have focused their efforts on religious outreach, preaching JI’s 
ideology, consolidating and regenerating the organization, and publically distancing 
themselves from direct ties to terrorism. JI traditionalist leaders clearly shifted their 
priorities towards JI’s long-term strategic goals.269 On the other hand, evidence from 
investigations of JI’s bombings shows how divided traditionalist and pro-violence 
elements actually were, and how they remained far from clear. 
Alternative interpretations of how JI has evolved describe JI’s leadership schism 
as less profound. Rather, JI’s evolution should be described as its leaders’ creative efforts 
to adapt and organizational learning by its members in response to existing security 
efforts. The alternative admits JI leaders’ debate tactics and methodology, but argues a 
sophisticated metamorphosis has taken place. Experts have noted loyalty to JI’s cause 
exceeds tactical and methodological differences of opinion.270 Alternatives claim JI 
members remain largely united.  
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There are many reasons to believe JI’s leadership is still cohesive. Traditionalist 
and pro-violence leaders are bound to one another through JI’s ideology. Neither faction 
leaders’ actions nor rhetoric indicates denouncement of JI membership or its ideology.271 
Many traditionalist and pro-violence leaders shared Ngruki and the mujahidin experience, 
which created nearly unbreakable bonds. Evidence shows loyalty amongst JI leaders is 
stronger than their public rhetoric might suggest. A good example of this loyalty can be 
observed in the relationship between Noordin Top and the man some experts believe was 
JI’s amir from 2003 to 2007, namely Abu Dujana. The two were both part of JI’s inner 
circle and shared similar views on jihad. Dujana was a Mantiqi II leader but was also a 
close associate of Hambali. Dujana was among the Bali 2002 planners and certainly 
aware of the 2003 bombing because he met with Top just prior to the attack. He also 
“gave highest priority to protecting JI members…he tried to mobilize the JI network to 
protect the perpetrators.”272 Moreover, as a member of the Central Command, he was 
unquestionably mainstream JI.273 No one can determine how frequently Dujana and Top 
met or what they discussed, but evidence shows JI’s leadership was coordinated and the 
administrative/operations “fracture” helped the organization survive.274 JI’s leaders 
understood the organization was under fire, but the Indonesian government was only 
going after direct ties to terrorism. JI’s leaders led their commands on separate 
trajectories but coordinated as necessary. Up through JI’s 2009 bombing, “at least 15 first 
generation leaders” had not been captured or killed.275 The distinct paths traditionalist 
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traditionalists have become less linked directly to terrorism. Without concrete links to 
terrorism, the government has been reluctant to apply pressure, which appears to be 
exactly what JI leaders have hoped for.276  
Analysis of Ba’asyir offers additional perspective regarding why one should 
question the extent of JI’s leadership rift. Considered by most to be JI’s spiritual leader, 
Ba’asyir is most often associated with traditionalists, but he has defended the actions of 
the pro-violence movement. This is the view of JI’s founder and the view of Abu Dujana, 
JI’s purported amir from 2003 until his arrest in 2007. JI’s leadership schism distances 
traditionalists from direct ties to terrorism, which in effect protects mainstream efforts. 
Since his release in 2006, Ba’asyir has returned to Islamic politics, condemnation of the 
Indonesian government and the West, and fiery, jihadi sermons. He recently established 
his own overt Islamist organization known as Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT). Several JI 
traditionalists and pro-violence members are reportedly members of JAT and have met 
under the same roof.277 
In any case, one is left with two competing interpretations of how JI’s leadership 
evolved. The first interpretation suggests JI’s leaders splintered into two factions, 
“including one which opposes the current bombing campaign.”278 The factions both 
advocate jihad to establish an Islamic state. Traditionalists view JI’s jihad in the long-
term and do not endorse suicide bombings.279 They believe “the personnel and strength 
to carry out jihad are both lacking,” and suicide bombings exacerbate the situation.280 
The second faction coined “radicals,” “pro-bombers,” or what the author refers to as pro-
violence, wage jihad by mounting terrorist attacks on U.S. and Indonesian interests 
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now.281 The alternative does not dismiss internal friction, but argues the splintering is 
overstated. It suggests JI remains cohesive and its leaders have simply learned and 
adapted to their environment in order to survive and advance the goals of the 
movement.282 Based on evidence provided thus far, the first interpretation rightly 
describes JI’s leaders as separating the organization, but the second interpretation appears 
more accurate. Available evidence presented already shows traditionalist members and 
leaders continued to coordinate and support pro-violence actors at the highest and lowest 
levels. JI’s leaders were running separate divisions, but the organization itself was not 
divided. 
In summary, JI’s leaders evolved the organization into traditionalist 
(administrative) and pro-violence (operations) sections in response to regional CT efforts. 
Their efforts have allowed JI’s leaders to adapt the organization into an increasingly 
difficult threat to counter. This division of responsibility allows traditionalists to sustain 
and improve upon JI’s capabilities and support pro-violence actors without sacrificing 
strategic efforts or exposing traditionalists to CT measures.283 Next, the author examines 
changes to JI’s organizational structure because it further helps in understanding the 
conventional wisdom and how alternatives might better describe JI’s evolution. 
3. Consolidating the Organizational Structure 
During this period, JI’s organizational structure also evolved. This section 
describes how JI’s organizational structure changed. It shows that mainstream JI elements 
across Southeast Asia merged into an “Indonesia-centric” organization and pro-violence 
elements seemed to break off and for the most part operated autonomously. These 
adjustments enabled each group to survive independently, function well around CT 
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efforts, and yet remain connected and mutually supportive when needed.284 This section 
first briefly reviews the main features of JI’s organizational structure. Then, it highlights 
the key changes that allowed JI’s factions to separately and collectively advance towards 
the broader JI objectives. This section suggests that mainstream JI’s consolidation and 
condemnation of JI’s pro-violence elements gave traditionalists the resources to rebuild 
the organization and it broke their visible ties with JI’s terrorist nodes. As such, 
traditionalists developed an ability to function openly because there were no longer 
noticeable ties to terrorism.285 Pro-violence elements fell outside the JI construct but 
retained linkages to mainstream JI, thus allowing for some success for both units.  
Once SEA authorities cracked down on JI members linked to terrorist attacks, the 
organization became unraveled. JI’s mantiqi structure was weakened and its command 
authority broken down. JI’s finances were exhausted, and their methods of 
communication were exposed and under heavy surveillance. The ability for JI elements to 
generate resources in a timely manner was severely degraded. The group was numerically 
diminished. In short, JI’s ability to function effectively was reduced. However, JI 
members were resilient and committed to the cause.286 In response, JI’s leaders evolved 
their organizational structure. 
Prior to the crackdown that began in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines in 
2001 and gradually in Indonesia following Bali 2002, JI’s structure was formal, 
hierarchical and well administered. At the top of the pyramid was the amir. Beneath him 
sat four councils: governing, religious advisory, religious law, and religious discipline. 
The governing council included the Central Command, which controlled the mantiqis. 
Beneath it sat the four transnational mantiqis and their respective units. Some evidence 
also indicates the existence of a military wing and special operations units that ran 
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parallel with the mantiqis. JI’s organizational structure functioned well as evidenced in 
the success of the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings and Bali bombings in 2002. However, 
JI members met hard times, which kept them from continuing to function smoothly. 
Despite diminished near-term offensive capacity, key decision makers still met and 
communicated. They determined JI would evolve its tattered organizational structure.287 
Mainstream JI leaders consolidated the network. They merged the remaining 
pieces of JI’s transnational mantiqi structure, reconfigured the structure to be more 
horizontal, and became “Indonesia-centric.”288 This change allowed JI’s strategic 
leadership to continue to meet and communicate frequently. At the tactical level, getting 
closer mitigated risks associated with long-range communications, allowing JI elements 
to coordinate around the new CT environment.289 
Despite consistent leadership losses, JI’s hierarchical structure remained in 
place.290 This is because a strong pool of individuals with jihad experience and expertise, 
religious credentials, and personal connections have continued to step up, enabling JI 
strategic command and control. At the same time, several of JI’s most accomplished 
leaders, although still at large, fled Indonesia and regrouped in areas that are more 
permissive. How they factor into JI’s consolidated structure cannot be conclusively 
determined.291 JI’s amir still holds the top-level position. The aforementioned councils 
advise the amir, and the Central Command communicates strategic direction and 
functional expertise down to the operational and tactical level.  
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It is not clear when these changes began taking shape, but evidence seized in 2007 
shows that at the operational and tactical level, JI had morphed into a “flatter and more 
segmented” organization “comprised of many autonomous and compartmentalized 
cells.”292 The former regional mantiqi structure was confined to Indonesia and reflected 
the merger between Mantiqi II and what was left of Mantiqi III. Beneath the Central 
Command were four functions: religious training, education, logistics, and military 
operations. Mantiqis carry out activities that support these functions. Mantiqi I was 
decimated but not completely destroyed. Top and Azahari took control of its remaining 
members. They did not reconstitute the Mantiqi I network in Singapore/Malaysia nor do 
experts suggest it became part of the consolidated structure. Experts believe JI elements 
still populate Singapore/Malaysia and may report to JI traditionalists, but their numbers 
are too small to constitute a separate mantiqi.  Of note, Top and Azahari did relocate to 
Indonesia but ostensibly did not fold in with the other mantiqis. Mantiqi I had always 
operated autonomously and continued to do so, with some evidence indicating it was by 
design.293 
Traditionalists have continued to adjust their organization. Based on the evidence 
seized in 2007, yet as early as 2004, JI consisted of one mantiqi spread across Indonesia 
divided into several wakalahs or districts. Wakalahs have approximately eighty members. 
Each wakalah handles its own operations, security, religious affairs, fundraising, and 
communications. Approximately twenty men are assigned to each function with four to 
five cells per function. Cells are compartmentalized from one another, as are functions. 
This structure makes JI units extremely tough to penetrate and mitigates the potential of 
more than one cell being directly linked to terrorism.294 What this conveys—
importantly—is that traditionalists are committed to operational security. 
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Mainstream JI’s consolidation and the pro-violence division’s splintering have 
allowed the organization to pursue near- and long-term strategies in keeping with JI’s 
ideology. Traditionalists focus on the long term. They control and populate the mantiqi 
and carry out administrative functions vital to regeneration and preparation of the 
network for future jihad against the Indonesian state. They appear detached from 
terrorism and function outside the purview of security dragnets. Traditionalists generate 
resources and allocate them sensibly towards the strategic efforts of the group. In short, 
traditionalists are rebuilding JI’s influence and membership. Their consolidated, 
compartmentalized nature is efficient. They minimize mass compromise and make it 
much harder to understand how JI functions collectively or what its true nature is. 
Discerning where ideological mobilization ends and where terrorism begins has become 
more difficult.295 
No evidence shows that JI’s pro-violence division is a separate mantiqi, but rather 
that it is a handful of unambiguously anti-Western terrorist cells that tap into the mantiqi 
as necessary. Investigations into the pro-violence division’s bombings show its members 
formed alliances outside the JI construct, which support the Top-led splintering, but the 
splintering also appears to be a mechanism to protect mainstream JI from direct ties to 
violence. JI’s pro-violence division did not lead but participated in communal violence in 
the mid-2000s and carried out the suicide bombings of this time period.296 Top’s division 
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his 2003 meeting with Abu Dujana. On more than one occasion though, pro-violence 
elements ostensibly operating outside JI’s structure coordinated efforts with 
traditionalists.297  
JI’s structure has evolved in ways analysts still grapple with today. Its 
consolidated and compartmentalized nature suggests a more complex evolution than 
splintering adequately describes. This section showed the changes to JI’s organizational 
structure is more than just a fracturing of the network. JI leaders divided their 
responsibilities in order to create breathing room to regenerate the movement and protect 
their limited resources, and at the same time still coordinate attacks. Evidence shows 
traditionalists have vocally separated themselves from terrorism, but traditionalist support 
for pro-violence actors is equally apparent.298 This relationship reflects mutual support 
and is protective in nature. 
An accurate description of the consolidated network reflects two divisions 
traveling separate paths that both work towards the same goal. Conventional wisdom 
assumes traditionalists and pro-violence elements compete from the same pool of 
resources, not use them in concert. Admittedly, traditionalists distanced themselves from 
being affiliated with JI pro-violence division’s bombing attacks, but the aforementioned 
sharing of personnel, logistic coordination, and providing of safe havens between 
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traditionalists and pro-violence elements casts doubt on the conventional wisdom.299 JI’s 
divisions appear to be two halves of a whole. Now, the author turns to analysis of JI’s 
operational and tactical evolution, which further suggests JI evolved collectively in order 
to adapt and adjust to the new CT environment. 
4. Operations and Tactics 
JI’s traditionalist and pro-violence divisions effectively evolved their operations 
and tactics during this time period. This section identifies and describes how JI modified 
its operational and tactical repertoire and illustrates how these activities changed, which 
appears to have benefited JI’s administrative and operational efforts and the 
organization’s aims collectively. These shifts further demonstrate JI’s intent to learn and 
adapt in response to the CT environment. JI’s evolution permitted traditionalists to 
regenerate the organization, expand their activities safely, and support pro-violence 
terrorist cells surreptitiously as they maintained their campaign of symbolic suicide 
bombings. These efforts kept the movement moving forward, and allowed JI to remain 
Southeast Asia’s largest and deadliest Islamist terrorist network.300 
As should be understood by now, the CT crackdown throughout this period 
substantially impacted JI members. JI’s leaders recognized they needed to adapt around 
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and pro-violence divisions evolved their operations and tactics in an effort to restore their 
near- and long-term capabilities and maintain a diverse campaign of non-violent and 
lethal operations to Islamize Indonesia.301  
a. Traditionalist Operations and Tactics 
Traditionalist operations and how they evolved reflect mainstream JI’s 
long-term focus and suggest one should not assume traditionalists have abandoned jihad 
or Top’s division despite their overt condemning of Top’s tactics. Since 2004, evidence 
shows traditionalist operations have been mostly non-violent in nature and focused on 
rebuilding, expanding, and preparing the movement to “transform Indonesia into an 
Islamic state.”302 Traditionalists have resiliently recruited and prepared new members for 
jihad. Moreover, traditionalists participated in communal conflict and provided support to 
pro-violence elements, indicating traditionalists remained advocates of violence at 
multiple levels.303 
Traditionalists worked within political and socio-economic channels to 
rebuild their base of support. They have provided social services and charity work in 
areas struck by natural disaster and where there were existing grievances against the 
government. They have received donations in return, which are applied towards religious 
outreach and education—direct lines—into JI’s recruitment pipeline. These efforts were 
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cheap and effective ways to recruit and generate resources out in the open. These 
operations were also particularly beneficial because they have been difficult to 
investigate or break up due to their sensitive nature and ties to the greater Muslim 
community. They have no doubt been vital to the continued survival and long-term vision 
of mainstream JI’s leadership.304  
Traditionalists evolved their fund-generating schemes and ways to get the 
message out in other ways as well. Mainstream JI members sold Islamic medicine and 
garments, and evidence from 2008 shows they have become increasingly involved in 
Islamic publishing. Islamic publishing companies owned by JI members print and 
distribute jihadi propaganda inside Islamic publications. This venture serves two valuable 
functions. Sale of the literature profits the owners who reportedly donate the money to JI, 
and the jihadi propaganda helps JI’s ideologues get their message out. This vicious cycle 
espouses hatred, provokes violence, generates resources and demonstrates one facet of 
the traditionalist's commitment to jihad. It is insightful to reflect on Ba’asyir’s words as a 
connection is made that links JI’s divisions: “I make many knives and I sell many knives, 
but I’m not responsible for what happens to them.”305 Traditionalists seem to be 
distancing themselves from actual violence and turning to new ways of mobilizing 
Muslims and regenerating JI’s ranks. However, these ventures have clear links to pro-
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bombings…sold Islamic remedies,” and another was a JI-affiliated “owner of a jihadi 
publishing company.”306 Perhaps, traditionalists embraced Ba’asyir’s way of thinking. 
Pro-violence operatives simply buy and use the knives traditionalists are making.307 
Traditionalists energized communal violence in Maluku and Sulawesi in 
the mid-2000s as JI elements had in 1999, and they have tried to keep those conflicts 
burning because they strengthened JI’s support base and helped recruitment efforts in the 
past. During these endeavors, traditionalists linked up with like-minded organizations, 
restored some capacity and carried out violent acts by justifying them as “avenging 
Muslim deaths and to shock the government into addressing unresolved issues…but also 
to keep a local jihad going so as to aid recruitment.”308 These efforts were cheaper, 
simpler, and less scrutinized by the Indonesian government and international community 
than suicide bombings. These activities masked by claims of “avenging Muslim deaths” 
really showed an intent to survive, grow back capabilities, expand the network, and carry 
out low-level acts of violent activities that are really designed to support short- and long-
term jihad strategies.309 
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b.  Pro-violence Operations and Tactics 
JI’s pro-violence division proved it too remained committed to jihad.310 
Largely operating autonomously, Top, Azahari, and their terrorist cells mounted a single, 
well-planned attack against Western targets each year between 2003 and 2005. The 2003 
and 2004 attacks utilized car bombs with large amounts of explosives. In 2005, Top’s 
operatives returned to Bali and they utilized three backpack bombers. Shortly after the 
2005 bombings, Indonesian CT authorities caught up with Azahari, killed him and seized 
several suicide vests and other materiel in a raid. Discovery of this equipment revealed 
Top’s intent to step up the bombing campaign, and the change in equipment confirmed 
the 2005 shift in tactics. The loss of materiel set JI’s pro-violence division back 
considerably. Top and his crew disappeared. Indonesian authorities maintained pressure 
on JI’s leadership and netted two senior leaders in 2007, one of which was Abu Dujana, 
and they executed a number of successful raids on suspected JI weapons and equipment 
caches. Seemingly, Top and his pro-violence division were put down.  
The years of 2006 through 2008 were devoid of major bombings, which 
led observers into a false sense of security in regards to the JI threat. Traditionalists had 
vocally condemned the large-scale bombings between 2003 and 2005 and had become 
considerably nonviolent. They had ostensibly withdrawn support to Top by encouraging 
him to splinter off reportedly in 2004, and Indonesia’s success in killing and detaining 
many of JI’s top leaders coupled with the major seizures of pro-violence bombing 
equipment had badly damaged both of JI’s divisions’ capacity to function.311 However, 
there is no compelling evidence to support leadership clashes over tactics continued 
between 2006 and 2008, indicating the leadership split described by some analysts is not 
an accurate interpretation of how JI evolved.  
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Top and his division were down but not out, and his support networks 
within JI were more sophisticated than many had thought. He returned to the international 
terrorism stage when his operatives bombed two U.S. hotels in Jakarta in 2009. These 
bombings demonstrated JI’s pro-violence division had been unable to carry out attacks 
between 2006 and 2008 because their capacity had been reduced. However, they had 
obviously recovered. Top’s division’s attacks, supported by traditionalist elements who 
provided logistical support and safe haven, suggest JI’s fracturing might be overstated. At 
an unforeseen level, JI had evolved. This latest attack demanded analysts reexamine pro-
violence links to traditionalists and reconsider JI as the most serious terrorist threat in 
Southeast Asia.312  
Shortly following Hambali’s arrest in 2003, Top and Azahari took charge 
of JI’s pro-violence efforts and have consistently evolved their operations and tactics 
since. Like the traditionalists, Top’s cells rekindled relationships with past allies and 
developed new ones so that they could carry out their goals.313 Top and Azahari 
successfully mounted suicide car bombings in 2003 and 2004. Technologically, the 
bombs improved steadily, which indicated a desire for maximum casualties and greater 
reliability. However, the technique was repetitive and expensive, and the pre-mature 
detonation outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004 prompted Top and Azahari 
to sideline the technique. Moreover, participants in the 2003 and 2004 operations came 
from both within and outside JI traditionalist circles. Pro-violence operatives also sought 
and received logistical support and protection from traditionalists. This is peculiar  
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because ostensibly, these attacks were planned and executed without resources or 
blessing from JI’s traditionalist leadership. As noted previously, evidence shows varying 
levels of support from within traditionalist circles.314   
Top and Azahari shelved car bombings after the 2004 attack and 
employed backpack bombs in their triple suicide bombings in Bali in 2005. This tactical 
shift had many implications. At a minimum, it allowed the bombers to get into the 
intended position for maximum desired effect—a major improvement—over the 2003 
and 2004 attacks. They were cheaper, easier to develop, manage and execute without 
suspicion, and even suggest an agreed upon technique between Top and traditionalists 
because bag bombs could better control collateral damage. The introduction of bag 
bombs also indicated a desire to step up the pace of attacks, but in late 2005, Indonesian 
authorities raided a pro-violence safe house, killing Azahari and seizing a sizable cache 
of suicide bombs and equipment. Top fled the scene, but recovered, adjusted and 
prepared for his next strike with help from traditionalists.315  
At the time Top’s cells went to ground, it appeared they could carry out 
one “major anti-Western bombing” attack per year.316 The attacks were designed to be 
symbolic, inflict mass casualties, and an effective response to improved awareness and 
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security measures. Some evidence reflected the notion that Top and his division were a 
separate, loose collection of cells functioning without help or endorsement from 
mainstream JI, but still other reporting presented showed this description was not entirely 
accurate.  
D. CONCLUSION—SPLINTERED OR NOT? 
JI was indeed in divisions, but not necessarily fractured. Fracturing assumes its 
parts compete from the same pool of resources, not create capabilities that both divisions 
utilize collectively. Based on evidence that describes traditionalist and pro-violence 
activities during this period, it is not conclusive that JI’s leaders were completely at odds. 
The author acknowledges that traditionalists openly condemned pro-violence bombings, 
but the evidence that dismisses traditionalist and pro-violence links is no more 
convincing than the evidence that shows coordination between the factions continued to 
take place.317 One must consider that JI’s factions might be resilient and cohesive, its 
evolution explained as leadership decisions manifested in organizational and tactical 
shifts to achieve its goals in response to the CT environment.  
Consider some closing observations. First, JI’s major terrorist attacks have invited 
chase. Pursuing Top’s cells has been the main effort for Indonesian authorities since Bali 
2002. Far less has been done to counter traditionalists because they do not pose an 
immediate threat or draw international pressure. This has given traditionalists the room to 
rebuild capabilities and improve prospects for the long term, because the separation keeps 
traditionalists off the radar of CT officials. Second, recall how traditionalist and pro-
violence operations and tactics have continued to support one another. Traditionalists 
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develop capabilities that not only strengthen the movement but they also create support 
networks that pro-violence operatives tap into to carry out symbolic attacks. Symbolic 
attacks garner the attention of the international community and generate large amounts of 
cash from abroad because mainstream JI can only generate enough resources 
domestically to keep the movement afloat.318 Third, reflect on the documented contact 
between pro-violence and traditionalist division leadership. If they were competing 
factions, traditionalist leaders would have given up pro-violence elements to authorities, 
but this has not happened.319 Analysts dismiss their interaction as loyalty and obligation 
but not active support.320 This is not completely accurate.321 How much coordination 
takes place when Top and traditionalists have met cannot be determined with any 
certainty. There exists an unambiguous level of loyalty and coordination between 
traditionalists and pro-violence operatives.322 Perhaps JI has not changed in the ways 
most experts think.323 
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The leading interpretation describing JI’s evolution reflects the notion that JI split 
into two factions on separate paths, both trying to achieve their goal of Islamizing 
Indonesia. However, as the author has demonstrated here, the analyses are inconclusive. 
The author shows that traditionalists became a largely nonviolent, administrative 
movement that surreptitiously supported pro-violence activities and operated openly 
because it was difficult for the government to pressure groups that did not have concrete 
violent links to it. Pro-violence elements carried out major bombing attacks with low-
level support from traditionalists, which shows JI’s factions are closer to functional 
divisions than competing organizations.324 The conventional wisdom is persuasive, but 
the alternatives deserve due credit. Tactical and organizational shifts should not be 
dismissed as splintering. They appear to be far more complicated and well planned out.  
It seems increasingly accurate to argue that JI’s traditionalist and pro-violence 
divisions “are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing.”325 Analysts have 
compared JI’s evolution to Hamas and Hezbollah and that makes sense. Most of JI’s 
work has become overt and charitable, while only a “small component of the organization 
remains the clandestine terrorist cell” needed to achieve effects in pursuit of their goal.326 
Indeed, JI members evolved. They survived, regenerated, and carried out major attacks, 
which has allowed them to morph into a more diverse, dangerous threat. 
Despite Indonesia’s efforts during this period, and the possibility of a divided JI, 
on July 17, 2009, JI members carried out suicide bombings on Western hotels in 
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personnel, resources, and safe haven from traditionalists, suggesting there remains some 
degree of cooperation between the factions. Moreover, Top may have acquired 
significant financial backing for the attacks from abroad.327 
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IV. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH: BRIDGING THE GAP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ending a four-year lull in major attacks on July 17, 2009, Noordin Top’s network 
carried out suicide bombings on Western hotels in Jakarta. Several people were killed and 
dozens more injured. The hotels targeted demonstrated that a clandestine group of JI 
members remained committed to undermining Indonesian and Western governments by 
attacking their socio-economic interests. The damage was minor compared to other 
bombings carried out by JI elements, but the symbolic attacks served as a reminder that JI 
was still the most capable, deadliest terrorist network in Southeast Asia.  
The attacks and subsequent discoveries jolted intelligence and security 
communities. Investigations revealed Top was in fact responsible for the bombings, 
indicating his group remained capable and motivated to execute lethal attacks, Together 
with recent reports that Top’s group again sought and received personnel, resources, and 
safe haven from traditionalist sources, describing JI’s traditionalist and pro-violence units 
as cooperative factions has become a very real possibility. Thus, debate reignited over the 
accuracy of interpretations regarding how JI has changed over time.328  
A few months later, Indonesian authorities made another startling discovery. They 
uncovered a terrorist coalition of pro-violence, traditionalists, and other jihadi elements 
with a purported new approach to jihad in the region. Further investigations exposed 
extensive ties between JI’s founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, his JAT organization, and the 
new coalition. These recent developments strongly indicate JI’s leadership, organization, 
and tactics are evolving in ways that few observers had predicted. Thus, the need to 
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accurately describe how JI has evolved remains relevant.329 Despite some observers 
concluding that the group was no longer cohesive or capable, these developments show 
JI’s members remain committed to jihad and its leaders continue to evolve their networks 
and tactics to achieve their goals. In short, the puzzle of how JI has evolved remains 
unsolved. 
This chapter examines JI’s evolution from the 2009 bombings through present 
day. The purpose is to describe how JI has evolved during this time period. This chapter 
analyzes recent reporting and discusses the major changes tied to JI. The author explores 
the state of JI’s ideology, leadership, organizational structure, and recent operations and 
tactics carried out by JI elements. JI’s leaders remain committed to jihad but they 
continue to struggle internally over tactics, which supports analyses that JI is fractured. 
However, evidence also shows traditionalists and pro-violence camps continue to work 
together, calling into question the accuracy of splintering as an adequate description of 
how JI has evolved. Moreover, JI elements in concert with other jihadi organizations 
have consolidated their operational and tactical capabilities in an attempt to maximize 
their efforts around Indonesia’s CT strategy. Concluding with the implications of 
Ba’asyir’s arrest and his involvement in recent events, this chapter closes having offered 
new insights regarding JI’s evolution, thus improving upon the understanding of the 
current nature of the JI threat and how its members are responding to Indonesian and 
foreign CT policies. 
The author argues that during this time period, JI’s factions functioned as 
administrative and operational divisions. They continued to debate tactics but remained 
mutually supportive. Traditionalist leaders continued to condemn bombings and major 
attacks in hopes it would provide breathing room while they continued to rebuild their 
capabilities and prepare for jihad. At the same time, traditionalist elements provided pro-
violence militants the assistance needed to carry out the 2009 bombings without exposing 
mainstream JI to CT measures. In other words, the JI network continues to evolve and 
conduct operations that support both their near- and long-term objectives.  
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B. INDONESIA RESPONDS, JI EVOLVES 
Indonesian authorities applied strong CT pressure to JI’s members for seven 
years, and their response to Jakarta 2009 was no different. Shortly after the bombings, 
Indonesia CT operatives neutralized Top and some of his inner circle. In September 
2009, Detachment 88 killed the leader of JI’s pro-violence division.330 Around the same 
time, several members of Top’s crew were also captured or killed. Importantly, 
discoveries surrounding these events caused analysts to reconsider Top’s networks. They 
were more extensive than previously assessed and had strong links to JI traditionalists.331  
Although there were indications of cohesion, experts still considered JI fractured. 
JI leaders had debated tactics since Bali 2002 and most observers believed major splits 
within the organization existed. Ideologically, the JI network was “strong, indeed, 
unbreakable. But as a political organization, it is divided, cash strapped, and to some 
degree rudderless.”332 Despite Indonesia’s successes and the optimistic analyses 
associated with them, a JI-affiliated attack was carried out, and several members of JI’s 
pro-violence division, with help from traditionalists, were responsible.333 At some level, 
JI’s leaders had addressed their shortfalls and adapted to them. 
As has been seen in the past, when CT authorities apply pressure to JI members, 
they evolve. If history provides any indication, the remaining members of Top’s cells 
would regroup and adapt around their losses and begin planning their next operation. In 
the latter half of this decade, traditionalists suffered their own setbacks, which may have 
driven them to reconsider their tactics as well. They consistently fell short in their 
attempts to find or retain a suitable leader, and their efforts to rebuild the organization 
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had not materialized as hoped. Despite the continued commitment of many members to 
“defend Muslims under attack,” and traditionalist leaders’ organizational shifts to 
consolidate and focus on “fomenting sectarian conflict in Sulawesi and Maluku as a way 
to regroup and indoctrinate a new generation of JI,” mainstream JI’s plan did not shake 
out.334 Indonesian authorities put the local violence down. The areas became quiet. In 
February 2007, traditionalist leaders met to discuss retaliatory operations in response to 
Indonesia’s police operations in Poso, Sulawesi. Purportedly, traditionalist leaders at the 
time determined the group would focus on rebuilding, not carrying out operations. This 
attitude might have caused disaffected members to join Top if the group really was split. 
However, that assumes traditionalists were not supporting Top secretly. Analysts 
observed, “major new fault lines emerging within the organization as a whole.”335 These 
observations combined with recent events warrant discussion and illuminate how JI 
evolved during this period of JI’s history. 
1. JI and Its Parts – The Ideologies 
JI’s ostensibly disparate parts continued to advocate jihad to restore the caliphate. 
This section describes the continuity JI’s ideology provided its factions, the recently 
dismantled AQA coalition, and JAT, which in part were populated by JI members. The 
ideologies are strikingly similar with slight differences, which shows JI’s divisions and 
new jihadi mutations are more alike than different. Traditionalists prepare for jihad 
through dakwah, pro-violence elements carry out attacks now, and the AQA coalition and 
JAT believe the right blend of both approaches is required to be successful. These 
observations imply JI’s evolution is less about factionalism and more about tactics. 
Comparing the ideologies of these entities adds value to how one can accurately describe 
JI’s evolution. 
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Not surprisingly, Abu Rusdan, the former JI amir and purported traditionalist 
leader, openly condoned jihad but condemned the 2009 bombings as unwise and 
counterproductive. Following Jakarta 2009, traditionalists officially opposed the 
bombings, JI’s pro-violence division’s prior attacks, and encouraged members to refrain 
from participating in major terrorist attacks. A year prior, reporting indicated 
traditionalists believed violence was “only justified as a way to defend Muslims in 
conflict areas. ‘The time isn’t yet ripe to wage jihad in Indonesia’ said Rusdan.”336 
Following the discovery of AQA’s camp on Aceh in early 2010, experts summarized the 
ideology of JI traditionalists as 
focused on religious outreach and education…and state JI leaders argue 
that in Indonesia today, there is no possibility of a secure base. The 
personnel and the strength to carry out jihad are both lacking. As a result, 
JI leaders, while acknowledging the need for jihad, believe it should be 
delayed until a critical mass can be built through dakwah.337  
Traditionalists opposed Top’s bombings, yet illustrated the desire for jihad if they 
could prepare traditionalists properly. JI’s leaders were not at odds over principles and 
goals, but over timing of tactics. Condemning the bombings was Rusdan’s effort to keep 
terrorism (and a CT response) at a distance from traditionalists and discourage 
mainstream members from participating haphazardly. Traditionalists are simply trying to 
keep their members out of jail and focused more on rebuilding the network. There is no 
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The 2009 bombings showed pro-violence terrorists remained committed to jihad 
as well. However, they showed it through symbolic attacks and criticized Rusdan’s 
hesitancy towards attacks.339 One can see that ideologically, JI’s divisions are aligned but 
remain divided over tactics and methodology. A few months after the bombings “a new 
coalition…that rejected both JI…and Top’s more violent splinter group” and with a 
shared jihadi ideology emerged.340  
The AQA coalition materialized as a separate organization, but its ideology 
mirrors that of JI. Thus far, evidence shows that AQA’s leaders felt a more rational 
strategy for jihad in Indonesia was required. AQA’s ideology reflects JI’s PUPJI: “create 
the secure base from which to operate and an organization that could control the base, 
apply Islamic law and serve as a proto-government.”341 Critical to this strategy was a 
combination of religious outreach and jihad. The big difference between this outlook and 
that of JI’s factions is that it was the merging of JI’s two approaches. In theory, it focused 
on jihad to win the space to establish the secure base, and utilized dakwah to build and 
expand the base for the future struggle. Analyzing AQA’s ideology reveals that some JI 
leaders were attempting to bridge the gap between traditionalists and pro-violence 
members under JI’s ideological umbrella.342 
Ba’asyir’s JAT movement also started receiving attention around the same time 
the AQA coalition was uncovered in early 2010. JAT’s ideology shares JI’s and other 
jihadi organizations' objectives. Based on recent reports, “Islamic teachings, according to 
JAT…must be applied in full…Islamic law must be the source of all justice,” and jihad is 
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the means to achieve this end.343 JAT religious scholars quote the same influences that 
inspired JI’s leaders and press the same principles of loyalty and obligation to gather 
Muslims under its banner. JAT operated openly and conducted religious outreach and 
education. Importantly, JAT drew supporters from across the jihadi spectrum to include 
traditionalists and pro-violence members. Although reports claim many who joined JAT 
fell out quickly, JAT, like AQA, was consolidating JI’s extremes, but JAT had not yet 
been linked to terrorism.344 In summary, the ideologies of these seemingly disparate 
movements share an ideology. It is only their tactical strategies that separate them. The 
latest jihadi movements are some of JI’s most influential leaders’ latest attempts to bring 
further coherence in order to adapt to Indonesia’s CT policies. 
2. JI’s Leaders – A Reunion of Sorts 
Evidence of the activities of JI leaders in the context of Jakarta 2009, the AQA 
coalition, and Ba’asyir’s JAT also offer insight regarding JI’s evolution. This section 
examines some of JI’s leaders and their interaction during this time period. It shows that 
Top and his inner circle have remained closely connected to mainstream JI. In fact, pro-
violence operatives relied on traditionalist support to successfully carry out Jakarta 2009. 
This section also traces the return of JI senior operative Dulmatin, who purportedly 
developed and led the AQA coalition and their terrorist training camp on Aceh. Lastly, 
the author continues to elaborate on the role of JI’s founder, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and his 
intimate involvement in the AQA coalition. The aforementioned developments 
surrounding JI leaders startled analysts because the relative peace between 2006 and 2009 
led many experts to believe JI was fractured and damaged beyond repair. Describing how 
some of JI’s most influential traditionalist and pro-violence leaders interacted with one 
another continues to strengthen the case that factionalism is not the whole story behind 
JI’s evolution. 
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Noordin Top was a key, yet controversial leader in the JI movement. He was 
responsible for all of JI’s major attacks since 2003. His tactics and methodology 
underpinned JI’s purported fractured state, but he was also responsible for bringing 
significant resources and international attention to the organization as a whole. Both 
traditionalists and pro-violence members will surely miss Top. He was a charismatic 
leader, manager, and expert recruiter. Top was operationally successful, which allowed 
JI’s message to garner international attention, and he managed to stay one step ahead of 
authorities because he “enjoyed protection from hardcore members of the JI community 
and other individuals who shared his ideology.”345 JI and the jihadi movement writ large 
undoubtedly felt Top’s demise, but his inner circle of leaders was equally close to 
mainstream JI members. Furthermore, based on previous evidence presented showing 
that mainstream JI was supporting pro-violence attacks, it would make sense that 
traditionalist leaders would need an operational commander of similar caliber to replace 
Top in order to maintain JI’s attack campaign. 
Despite their criticism of Abu Rusdan, Top’s leaders are deeply tied to 
mainstream JI. They are alumni of JI schools and maintained close relationships with 
traditionalists and key leaders, and some are members of organizations like Ba’asyir’s 
JAT, which created a broad, sophisticated network of support. These ties have provided 
pro-violence leaders a mechanism to tap into the mainstream JI support structure in order 
to mount attacks. Traditionalists reject pro-violence on the surface, but reporting shows 
traditionalists grew jihadists at JI schools and allowed them to be recruited into Top’s 
ranks by his leaders. Top’s leaders do not seem to be disenchanted with mainstream JI; 
rather, they carry out a covert aspect of the movement’s tactical repertoire. Evidence of 
the activities of Top’s leaders does not reflect outright factionalism; they indicate a 
sophisticated division of labor. In short, Top’s leaders were crucial to the success of 
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Jakarta 2009 and their operational role within JI’s administrative/operational division 
construct allowed remaining leaders to evade arrests, adapt to membership losses, and 
accordingly fall in with Dulmatin following the post-Jakarta 2009 crackdown.346 
Evidence of some of the latest attempts by JI’s leaders to evolve the movement 
began surfacing in early 2010. A terrorist training camp was discovered in Aceh in 
February 2010, and preliminary investigations strongly indicate the Aceh camp was the 
base of the AQA coalition led by JI senior operational leader Dulmatin. Top’s latest 
bombings, followed by his death and coupled with traditionalist shortfalls, influenced JI’s 
leaders to evolve the movement significantly. Interestingly, the camp appeared to be a 
conglomerate of “virtually every known jihadi organization in Indonesia.”347 
It is unclear when Dulmatin returned to Indonesia, but some evidence shows the 
AQA coalition formed in late 2009. The timing of Top’s most recent bombings, his 
death, and Dulmatin’s appearance indicate Dulmatin was brought in to replace Top or at 
least rein him in and combine JI’s efforts on a broader scale.348 As noted, Top was 
resourceful, perhaps JI’s top financier and recruiter. ICG notes, “in some cases militant 
jihadis who want more action than their leaders may seek him out, rather than vice 
versa.”349 This of course, is indicative of the administrative, operational relationship that 
describes JI’s evolution. Dulmatin, a well-respected JI commander, Bali 2002 operative 
and guerilla warfare expert—arguably a legend among jihadi circles—was brought in to 
lead JI’s clandestine operations. Evidence shows Dulmatin was “given protection by JI’s 
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central leadership to initiate new jihadist operations in Indonesia.”350 Moreover, he was 
reportedly in touch with individuals, “all of whom had been close to Noordin before,” 
and they were interested in Dulmatin’s coalition.351 Like Top, Dulmatin’s inner circle 
was made up of respected JI members with close connections to traditionalists and pro-
violence elements. Additionally, some of Dulmatin’s core leaders had links to Ba’asyir’s 
JAT. Dulmatin’s role is clearly evidence of efforts to reinvigorate the JI movement, 
bridge the gap between traditionalists and pro-violence operators formally, and make best 
use of their capabilities. In any case, Dulmatin met his demise in March 2010. Following 
up on a lead from the AQA Aceh camp investigation, Detachment 88 tracked down 
Dulmatin and killed him during a firefight in Jakarta. Additionally, at least 48 members 
of the coalition were arrested and seven killed.352 
Surprisingly, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the ostensible spiritual leader of JI and most 
often associated with traditionalists, emerged shortly after Dulmatin was killed. His JAT 
movement, defense of Top’s attacks, and involvement in the AQA coalition together 
provide further evidence of the united, coherent nature of JI’s evolution. On August 9, 
2010, Indonesian authorities arrested Ba’asyir “as part of their ongoing investigations” 
into the Aceh camp. Indonesian authorities had proof that Ba’asyir financed the camp, 
AQA, and was personally involved in the appointment of its leaders and planning of the 
coalition’s terrorist operations.353 Despite evidence that traditionalists and hardliners had 
both eschewed Ba’asyir for not being militant enough, the latest evidence surrounding 
Ba’asyir, Dulmatin and AQA indicate he, along with Dulmatin, led the efforts to bridge 
the gap between JI’s two factions to create a jihadi enterprise with JI as its heart.354  
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Ba’asyir has been a central yet controversial figure in JI and the jihadi movement 
as a whole. Ba’asyir is considered the “elder statesman of Indonesia’s radical 
movement,” but some experts do not believe Ba’asyir is the lynchpin of the movement 
today.355 As was the case earlier this decade, some JI leaders viewed Ba’asyir as a poor 
manager and strategist. At the same time, Ba’asyir’s recent involvements beg analysts to 
reconsider his role in JI. Prior to his involvement in the coalition, Ba’asyir led the JI-
affiliated MMI, but he left it in 2008 in order to start up JAT. JAT is both populated and 
rejected by JI members. Ba’asyir’s JAT could be a splinter, but its goals are analogous 
with JI, so it should also be equally considered a mutually supportive movement. 
Ba’asyir has remained distanced from overt links to terrorism, but he has also retained his 
fiery jihadi rhetoric. While certain traditionalist leaders have condemned Noordin’s 
attacks publically, Ba’asyir has historically defended Top, arguing his tactics were 
misplaced but his intentions righteous. Considering Ba’asyir is mainstream JI, it appears 
traditionalist rhetoric supports two views. On the one hand, Abu Rusdan rejected major 
bombings, but on the other, Ba’asyir, JI’s founder, endorsed Top’s operations and 
provided him rhetorical support. Ba’asyir recent actions coupled with his rhetoric over 
time showed JI’s ostensible divisions had not abandoned violence or each other, and 
confirmed an interpretation that describes traditionalists and pro-violence terrorists as two 
halves of a whole.356 
Now that Indonesian authorities have arrested Ba’asyir and charged him as the 
amir and spiritual leader of the AQA coalition, the author’s argument that JI’s divisions 
are closer than experts have given them credit for becomes stronger.357 Ba’asyir was 
attempting to consolidate JI’s factions in a more formal way and combine their efforts 
with that of the larger jihadi movement. The links between Top, his leaders, Dulmatin, 
Ba’asyir, and traditionalists reflect efforts by Dulmatin and Ba’asyir to overcome the 
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tactical differences of Rusdan and Top. Indeed, the actions of JI’s leaders say a lot about 
JI’s evolution. Ba’asyir, one of the few leaders left standing, denies allegations he is 
involved in AQA or terrorism, and he still denies the existence of JI. Recent events 
clearly call into question Ba’asyir’s credibility. Perhaps, one should be just as suspicious 
of Rusdan.358 
3. Consolidated and Aligned – The New JI? 
Recent developments and reporting reveal significant changes within the 
organizational structure of the Indonesian jihadi movement. This section describes these 
changes and how they impact one’s understanding of JI’s evolution. As to be expected, 
traditionalists remained vocally firm in their commitment to jihad, but purportedly 
refrained from participating in AQA because they did not agree with the coalition’s 
approach to actively engage the enemy through attacks. Traditionalists stated, “the 
faithful currently lack the resources to take on the enemy and therefore should focus on 
building up their ranks through dakwah (religious outreach).”359 Ba’asyir, some of Top’s 
inner-circle, and some more militant traditionalists and followers of Ba’asyir developed 
JAT. Moreover, remaining members of Top’s division, members of JAT, and several 
other organizations consolidated elements of their membership into the AQA coalition.360 
At a minimum, the merger of these groups indicates that JI’s leaders and their vast 
network remain connected and motivated to adapt JI’s existing organizational structure 
and that of the jihadi movement in order to wage jihad “as the means to the end of 
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applying Islamic law in full.”361 It is clear that JI’s leaders have not seen eye to eye on all 
tactical and strategic viewpoints. However, merging and aligning their structures coupled 
with some leaders denying overt support—only to be contradicted by evidence—suggests 
support is taking place and are indications that JI’s parts do support each other’s activities 
and may be trying to improve the state of JI without making its membership base 
vulnerable to charges of terrorism. 
Despite Rusdan’s claims that traditionalists abstained from participation in the 
coalition, there are reasons to believe traditionalists to some degree supported AQA’s 
efforts. Evidence shows mainstream JI is suffering. Its “geographical reach, leadership, 
resources, and message” are limited and ineffective.362 Rather than end, mainstream JI 
leaders like Ba’asyir and Dulmatin saw the need for change. They developed AQA and 
incorporated mainstream JI members for resources and logistical support, which 
developed new capacity and placed JI at the heart of the coalition even if traditionalists 
did not formally attend the training. Providing administrative support to AQA bolsters 
mainstream JI’s suffering capabilities and reinvigorates support for leaders representing 
JI, even if Rusdan denies traditionalist involvement in the group. As the ostensible voice 
of mainstream JI, but clearly not in control of many mainstream JI members, Rusdan’s 
rhetoric remains nothing more than a tactic to keep traditionalists protected from being 
charged with terrorism. Aside from Dulmatin and Ba’asyir, evidence shows several JI 
members from traditionalist-led schools are involved in AQA, which suggests one of two 
things. Either traditionalist leaders like Rusdan function in name only and decisions are 
made at other levels, or traditionalist rhetoric like that of Rusdan’s regarding AQA is 
further evidence of a secret, mutually supportive relationship between traditionalists and 
terrorists designed to regenerate the movement and stay off the radar of Indonesian 
authorities.363 Either way, some traditionalists are no doubt involved in a consolidation 
process with both pro-violence elements, and other jihadi movements and mainstream JI 
leaders are at the center of its development. 
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JAT, Ba’asyir’s overt radical Islamist movement, is evidence of efforts to more 
formally consolidate traditionalists and pro-violence elements. Ba’asyir, apparently 
unhappy with JI’s current state, resigned from MMI in 2008 and developed JAT. The 
creation of JAT shows Ba’asyir wanted to reradicalize mainstream JI in an attempt to 
bolster its struggling efforts. MMI, an organization Ba’asyir brought to life and thought 
by many to be JI’s overt “civil-society arm,” became unacceptable to him, which led to 
his resignation. He felt MMI’s leadership structure was “un-Islamic.”364 Generally 
speaking, Ba’asyir believed MMI had become too democratic, and not enough authority 
was placed in the hands of the amir.365 Ba’asyir disagreed with the increasingly secular 
nature of MMI and its efforts to work with the Indonesian government. Preferring a more 
traditional Islamic leadership structure, Ba’asyir left and took several influential MMI 
leaders with him and established JAT.366 JAT and AQA was his answer to a withering JI 
and MMI. JAT is similar to MMI in that it is an overt political organization, which 
“recruits through mass rallies and smaller religious instruction,” advocating Shari’a and 
jihad as the means to achieve their goals, and like JI in its not so distant past, it 
clandestinely supports terrorism to achieve their goals.367 When approached this way, 
JAT and AQA were developed by Ba’asyir to be a resurgence of JI. 
Further analysis of JAT’s organizational structure helps make the case for 
accurately describing how JI has evolved. Thanks to Ba’asyir’s connections and status, 
JAT became a sizable group in just a few years. It is a well-organized, nationwide 
organization. Its leaders built a strong core of members, to include members of Top’s 
organization, traditionalists, and other components of the jihadi movement.368 Despite 
arbitrary differences in ideology and tactics, Ba’asyir developed JAT to be structured as a 
moniker replacement for JI. It is a sophisticated, well-administered, hierarchical 
organization from its advisory councils down to its functional specialties. Ba’asyir denies 
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allegations of his or JAT’s involvement in planning violence, yet Indonesian authorities 
have evidence that JAT funded AQA, an organization that is in part composed of JI’s 
remaining pro-violence militants.369 With Ba’asyir as amir of both organizations, it is 
clear AQA was designed in part as JAT’s military wing, which parallels JI’s structure 
even more.370 
At first glance, it may appear that Ba’asyir’s JAT is competing with Rusdan’s JI, 
but that is not necessarily the case. Admittedly, the activities that JAT has involved itself 
in, coupled with the almost identical organizational structure, could easily lead analysts to 
suspect competition, even question if Ba’asyir still is a part of JI. Indeed, some experts 
have concluded that JAT and Rusdan’s reactions to JAT illustrate JI’s fractured state. 
However, reflecting on JAT’s organizational structure—who it consists of and how it 
functions—it becomes clearer that JAT is not a splinter. JAT and its AQA action arm are 
what JI is evolving into. Many within mainstream JI felt the JI moniker was old, 
tarnished and hampering their efforts to achieve JI’s goals. They saw JAT as a new 
package to carry out JI’s vision of jihad so they joined.371 JAT may not be JI in name, 
but its members have taken on JI’s form and vision because association with JI has 
constrained its members too much and they can no longer operate actively without taking 
heavy losses. This is known because JAT has been critical of traditionalist inactivity and 
its leaders’ tendencies to only wage jihad through rhetoric.372 In short, this section 
described how some of mainstream JI’s core leaders consolidated JI’s existing structure 
and developed a new organization with JI’s vision at the center in the hopes that it could 
maximize JI’s existing capabilities in order to continue its struggle to achieve its goals. 
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4. Operations and Tactics – The Future JI 
Jakarta 2009 and the events that have occurred since add useful detail to the 
understanding of how JI has evolved and where its members are taking the organization. 
This section describes the operations and tactics employed by JI’s pro-violence division, 
its future plans, and the operations and tactics of JAT and AQA. They are further 
evidence that JI’s members continue to evolve collectively in order to remain a relevant 
and increasingly dangerous terrorist movement.  
Examining evidence from the 2009 bombings helps to accurately describe how 
JI’s members continue to evolve the group. The targets were two Western hotels utilized 
almost exclusively by foreigners and businessmen, and the attacks took place around the 
time of Indonesia’s presidential elections. The bombings did not impact the political or 
economic situation in the country significantly, but did devastate the business community 
and brought international attention back to JI’s struggle. The choice of targets reflects JI’s 
pro-violence division’s commitment to carry out attacks against the West and the 
international community. As discussed previously, these attacks and Top’s bombing 
campaign as a whole have been deemed counterproductive by mainstream JI and were 
ostensibly not endorsed by the movement, yet they occurred.373 Thus, their purpose 
warrants further discussion.  
Attacks that garner international attention have been lucrative ventures for JI. Up 
through the 2003 bombings, Attacks by JI elements were largely funded by al-Qaeda. 
Investigations into Jakarta 2009 indicate the latest bombings were funded externally, by 
al-Qaeda or an affiliate. Reflecting on how al-Qaeda responded to JI’s bombings earlier 
this decade, it is likely that Top and his pro-violence division’s symbolic bombings were 
JI’s mechanism to elicit external resources for the struggling movement. Reporting shows 
pro-violence operatives wanted to carry out more attacks, but severe losses and 
operational disruptions forced Top’s division to go to ground.374 Once CT pressure 
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lessened, JI pro-violence elements resumed their campaign. Considering the setbacks 
discussed with respect to both traditionalist and pro-violence camps in the latter half of 
this decade, it becomes clear that Top planned and had his division execute Jakarta 2009 
for not only symbolic value, but also for practical and financial reasons. 
The 2009 bombings were efficient, sophisticated, innovative, and symbolically 
effective. Top and his cells were meticulous in their surveillance, operational security, 
planning, preparing, and execution efforts. Operatives blended in to the hotels, were 
acutely aware of the surroundings, and they evolved their bomb preparation and 
employment to ensure desired effects. The bomb-making material was brought into the 
hotels in pieces and the bombs were constructed inside instead of bringing in the weapons 
on the day of execution, thus allowing for maximum concealment. This attack indicates 
pro-violence elements were truly determined to carry out major attacks on Western 
targets.375 
Investigations into Top and his division since the bombings provide evidence of 
additional attack plans and how he was resourced. Top was planning a car bomb 
assassination against Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono, and he had elicited and received 
external funding. Moreover, administrative/operational relationships between 
traditionalists and Top’s pro-violence elements persist yet remain debated. It is clear Top 
and his division relied on “JI social networks and JI-linked madrassas for support and 
recruitment,” but some experts continue to understate the level of cooperation between 
the two factions.376 They assert Top’s support comes from disaffected members of JI and 
other jihadi organizations and do not reflect endorsement of mainstream JI, although the 
same experts admit evidence shows Top could depend on the larger JI movement for 
logistic support and protection as required.377 It is simply not accurate to conclude that 
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traditionalists condemn Top and his activities because at a sub-level, mainstream JI 
elements clearly support his survival and success. As described previously, traditionalists 
coordinated with pro-violence terrorists to carry out Jakarta 2009 despite rhetoric from 
traditionalist leaders suggesting otherwise. As events have unfolded, it becomes accurate 
to argue that traditionalists and pro-violence elements continue to evolve and perform 
mutually supportive functions to achieve the same goal. As the description of JI’s 
evolution continues, particularly the operations and tactics of the AQA coalition, it 
becomes more apparent JI members continue to adapt and the two factions are not nearly 
as divided as some experts have interpreted them to be.  
The AQA coalition, which came to rise after Top’s death, is led by mainstream JI 
leaders and is a blend of traditionalist and pro-violence approaches to jihad as the means 
to achieve their end. AQA members embrace classic guerilla tactics: assassination and 
coordinated, precision small arms attacks. The coalition intends to carry out these types 
of attacks to win territory, establish a pure Islamic community, and slowly expand it until 
it becomes strong enough to take on the Indonesian government. Future targets include 
both Indonesian and U.S./Western government officials to include one exposed plan to 
assassinate President Yudhoyono and for “Mumbai-style attacks in Jakarta.”378 These 
types of tactics, if planned right, will be much more difficult to counter post-attack, and 
they also reflect a desire to minimize Muslim collateral damage.379 In short, AQA was 
the product of lessons learned by JI leaders over the past decade of jihad and merging 
traditionalist and pro-violence operations and tactics in a concerted fashion. 
Not surprisingly, JAT members, who include traditionalists and pro-violence 
members, conduct similar operations as traditionalists have since 2004 with a few slight 
differences. JAT conducts religious outreach, education, and social services, which are 
designed to win support for Shari’a implementation, as well as radicalize and recruit 
support for jihad against the Indonesian government. Different from JI though, JAT does 
not operate in secret. Its leaders hold mass rallies to protest and win support, which 
shows it is willing to participate in the political process. This has led to controversy 
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across the jihadi movement spectrum, but may be more beneficial than costly. 
Participating in the political process has alienated JAT from some devout Muslim groups 
who do not see the Indonesian government as legitimate.380 That being said, JAT 
operating within the law gives itself legitimacy with more moderate Muslims and far 
more cover than rhetorical condemnation of bombings has given traditionalists. JAT’s 
tactics are the definition of evolved traditionalist tactics.  
Despite JAT and its AQA military wing’s operational tactics, which attempted to 
bridge the gap between JI’s factions, ongoing debate between Rusdan and Ba’asyir over 
tactics shows JI’s senior leadership remains committed to exploring how JI can be 
cohesive, coherent and simultaneously survive CT efforts to dismantle the group. Rusdan 
claims traditionalist operations remain detached from anti-Western violence, and he 
warns jihadists not to be hasty in their decisions to carry out major attacks. Ba’asyir 
defended AQA’s initiative advocating jihad in all forms as an obligation, as preparing for 
jihad and carrying out attacks were both noble efforts. Rusdan and Ba’asyir’s interaction 
provide some hints of mutual support, but clearly Rusdan remains overly cautious of 
implicating traditionalists in a fight he believes brings costly CT pressure. He believes 
more religious outreach is required and a larger community established before 
traditionalists can take openly aggressive steps towards jihadi violence. Rusdan and 
Ba’asyir’s views do not reflect direct opposition; rather, they show JI senior leaders are 
the heart of the jihadi movement and are actively working through the current problems 
within the jihadi movement. As mainstream JI’s amir Rusdan and JAT/AQA’s amir 
Ba’asyir, their words demonstrate a relationship and desire to evolve that jihadists and 
experts may not see. Rusdan reaffirmed JI was supporting jihad in ways most did not 
realize, and Ba’asyir’s thoughts ultimately support JI’s dakwah efforts as well as the 
coalition’s, thus showing mainstream the efforts of JI and JAT/AQA are inextricably 
linked.381 
Regardless of Ba’asyir and Dulmatin’s efforts to bring large portions of 
mainstream JI, JI pro-violence militants and the jihadi movement as a whole together 
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choosing Aceh as their base was a catastrophic mistake. AQA’s leaders picked Aceh for 
several reasons. It had served the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) well in their guerrilla 
struggle and Aceh could apply shari’a already, so AQA’s leaders thought Aceh’s 
religious leaders would be receptive to their presence. Furthermore, a number of Islamist 
organizations already populated Aceh, so AQA’s leaders suspected their support base 
might be able to expand quickly. This however was not the case. The Acehnese were not 
receptive to AQA and had no interest getting into another conflict unless it was blessed 
by Aceh’s ulamas. Nonetheless, AQA’s leaders decided to base their operation in Aceh 
in 2008. In late 2009, plans progressed and by early 2010, the coalition was up running 
and providing training. Soon though, a local man fell upon the camp and reported it to the 
local authorities. Several CT operations followed in February and March of 2010. 
Arrests, investigations, and discoveries exposed the nature of the organization and its 
leaders. From these discoveries, Indonesian authorities were able to dismantle the 
organization, killing Dulmatin and other key AQA leaders. CT pressure has continued 
with the latest development being the discovery of Ba’asyir and JAT’s role in AQA.382 
Whether the charges against Ba’asyir will stick and what the future holds for JAT is not 
clear, for now, Ba’asyir and Dulmatin’s attempt to consolidate JI’s divisions in a more 
formal manner and create a larger jihadi movement with JI leaders as its heads has been 
defeated. 
The operations and tactics discussed above demonstrate how JI’s leaders continue 
to evolve the movement. The 2009 bombings illustrate Top’s evolution, and the events 
following suggest some traditionalists, Ba’asyir’s JAT, and Ba’asyir and Dulmatin’s 
AQA attempted to merge their tactics to maximize their limited capabilities in the interest 
of advancing JI’s cause. The separate tactics of JI’s leaders already had overlap, but 
mainstream JI members like Ba’asyir and Dulmatin believed more coordination was a 
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fitting solution to adapting to the CT environment.383 While well intended, the Aceh 
debacle did more harm than good for JI and the jihadi movement because some its most 
creative and charismatic leaders are behind bars or met their demise.384 How JI members 
will evolve from here is anyone’s guess. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The AQA coalition—JI’s latest evolution—failed. Since its discovery, over 100 
people have been arrested, and over a dozen killed to include members of Top and 
Dulmatin’s inner circles. Ba’asyir is behind bars and Indonesian authorities believe they 
have a strong case against him. Observers of the aftermath see overwhelming evidence 
that the jihadi movement has suffered. Now more than ever, JI and the jihadi movement 
writ large “is a weak and divided movement, and there is no indication that it is 
growing.” 385 That being said, these same experts believe the group will bounce back, 
mutate, and strike again. The attempt by Ba’asyir and Dulmatin to morph JI’s divisions 
and bolster its capabilities by developing AQA was “the same old faces finding new 
packages for old goods.”386 If that is the case, the author’s hypothesis accurately 
describes how JI has evolved. AQA was the clearest sign that JI’s 
administrative/operational partnership existed and Ba’asyir and Dulmatin wanted to take 
it to a new level. Despite AQA’s failure, remaining JI members and their jihadi partners 
will learn from these events and will continue to evolve and carry out some form of jihad 
to achieve their goal. History shows that traditionalists, pro-violence terrorists, and other 
like-minded organizations will adapt and work together whenever and wherever they can 
because the jihadi ideology JI members believe in continues to provide continuity and 
cohesion.387 To be sure, traditionalists and the terrorists they support, along with other 
jihadi groups like JI, will learn from the mistakes made by Ba’asyir and Dulmatin and 
adapt creatively in order to continue to advance towards their goals. 
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To summarize, this chapter analyzed recent developments that help to accurately 
describe JI’s evolution. It captured key changes in the strains that make up the JI network 
today. The author examined JI’s ideology, leadership, organizational structure, and 
operations and tactics, and showed how they illustrated JI as a coherent, cohesive 
network attempting to adapt to its environment. These changes have allowed JI members 
and their cause to survive, and while they continue to experience significant setbacks, JI 
members are resilient and will find a way to reemerge and fight another day. AQA might 
not have called itself JI, but traditionalist and pro-violence involvement in the coalition 
strongly indicates some of JI’s most instrumental leaders were adapting their structure 
and tactics to strengthen JI and lead the jihadi movement in Indonesia.  
The true nature of how JI’s members coordinate remains muddy. Some evidence 
supports interpretations that JI exists as two separate factions: traditionalists and pro-
violence. Traditionalists remain a separate movement, and pro-violence elements may 
revert back to Top’s loose cellular structure and carry out bombings as opportunities 
present themselves. Alternative interpretations do not dismiss this relationship, but it 
lacks thorough accuracy. JI’s parts may be separate, but they are mutually supportive. 
This chapter advocates the latter explanation’s line of thinking. This separate but 
mutually beneficial relationship is the one that has allowed JI to endure, and it will allow 
JI’s message and members to not only survive but also adapt into a new and diverse 
threat in the future.388 There is already evidence that violence will continue, and the 
guerilla-style assassination tactics utilized thus far are a clear indication the vision and 
tactics JI’s leaders espoused through AQA have taken root.389 
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While some terrorist movements decline and even disappear, JI has evolved in 
ways that enable it to remain Southeast Asia’s most dangerous Islamist terrorist threat. As 
this thesis has shown, JI clearly has not disappeared. To the contrary, its members have 
not only survived but have adapted, making the JI threat today a more diverse and 
progressively difficult one to counter. Yet until just a couple years ago, the conventional 
wisdom was that JI was internally divided and its capacity for violence sharply 
diminished. JI’s unexpected adaptation and survival presents a puzzle that this thesis has 
sought to resolve by tracing JI’s evolution from its inception through the present day.  
Part of the reason why JI’s members have been able to adapt successfully is 
because Southeast Asian governments and their allies have developed CT policies based 
on a particular interpretation of JI. They have tended to see JI as composed of two 
factions, traditionalists and pro-violence militants, and have focused their CT policies on 
reducing the terrorist activities carried out by the pro-violence militants. However, as this 
thesis has shown, there is much more cooperation between the two factions than 
commonly thought. In fact, JI’s leaders have been able to evolve the group in creative 
and successful ways, in large part because the traditionalist wing has continued to 
regenerate membership, resources, and thus facilitate acts of violence in pursuit of the 
entire group’s ideological objectives. Reliance on inaccurate interpretations has failed to 
sufficiently address the true nature of the JI threat. Far too little time and space has been 
given to analyzing traditionalists and their partnership with pro-violence militants leading 
to an enduring JI movement.  
This thesis shows that describing as accurately as possible how JI has changed 
over the past two decades remains a challenge because much of what is known about JI 




findings that challenge the conventional wisdom, and which the author hopes will 
influence future CT policies so that JI and the transnational jihadi movement writ large 
will not be able to continue to survive, adapt, and perpetuate their struggle.  
In order to accurately describe what JI is and how it has changed over time, this 
thesis examined JI’s ideology, leadership, organizational structure, and operations and 
tactics over the course of the group’s nearly 20-year existence in order to trace important 
kinds of variation and continuity. Describing variation and continuity has enabled the 
author to show how the two competing interpretations emerged, and assess the relative 
accuracy of these two competing interpretations.  
This chapter briefly summarizes the findings of this thesis, which have allowed 
the author to develop a detailed description and reach a solid conclusion about the 
accuracy of interpretations describing how JI has evolved and the true nature of the JI 
threat. It reflects on how JI’s members created and developed the organization into a 
cohesive terrorist organization capable of carrying out lethal terrorist attacks. It highlights 
how JI’s members evolved the group after Bali 2002 in order to remain Southeast Asia’s 
most dangerous terrorist threat. It then reviews how JI leaders evolved the group yet 
again following Jakarta 2009 in an effort to remain a coherent terrorist movement capable 
of advancing towards its objectives.  
This description of JI’s ideology, leadership, organizational structure, and 
operations and tactics demonstrates that JI began as a united organization. It changed 
over time into two separate, yet mutually supportive administrative and operational 
divisions: traditionalists and pro-violence militants respectively. Evidence shows JI’s 
divisions continue to work in this way today, but recent events indicate JI members are 
making efforts to unite the group more formally and bolster their resources in the form of 
the AQA coalition, which looks to place JI leadership at its center. Describing how JI has 
evolved in this manner shows that alternative interpretations of how JI has evolved are in 
fact more accurate descriptions. JI’s members are largely united and actively coordinating 
to operate collectively and effectively around Southeast Asian governments and their 
allies’ CT efforts. This is the current nature of the JI threat. It is a sophisticated, 
dangerous, and enduring threat.  
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By understanding the true nature of the JI threat, the author’s findings become 
increasingly important because they are relevant to how Southeast Asia and its allies 
should counter JI and groups like it. Now that it is known how JI members have evolved, 
one can properly evaluate the threat it poses to U.S. and Indonesian interests, develop and 
broaden the understanding of how terrorist groups might evolve, and offer suggestions 
for how Indonesia and its allies might improve their CT policy for the future. 
B. CONCLUSIONS ON JI’S INCEPTION THROUGH BALI 2002 
The author’s analysis and description of JI’s origins, formal inception in 1993, 
and formative years culminating in Bali 2002 established a clear picture that in this first 
period of JI’s history, its members became an organized, coherent, terrorist organization 
dedicated to their ideology, obedient to their leaders, and unswervingly loyal to one 
another. The author showed how Sungkar, Ba’asyir and the tightly knit following they 
developed formed and cultivated JI’s ideology, organizational structure, and operations 
and tactics with the sole purpose of creating a united, counter-state movement capable of 
carrying out violent jihad as the means to establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia as the 
foundation to a pan-Islamic caliphate across Southeast Asia.  
Important to understanding why the author’s description is accurate, Chapter II 
showed that from its beginnings through Bali 2002, JI’s members were very much a 
united organization. Despite the rise of internal debate over tactics between JI leaders 
sparked by serious losses in personnel and resources as a result of new, external-CT 
pressure, JI’s leaders and members remained largely cohesive and their actions coherent. 
Evidence presented showed they continued to support one another’s activities to the 
greatest extent possible, and demonstrated an aptitude to learn, adapt, and evolve their 
structure and tactics in order to become a more effective organization and continue to 
carry out acts of violence against Indonesian and Western interests. JI’s ideology 
provided continuity despite internal friction. It reinforced their united nature, thus 
enabling JI elements to resiliently adjust to their environment, maintain cohesion across 
the region, and operate collectively. As such, their efforts culminated in the suicide 
bombings of two Western hotels and the U.S. Consulate in Bali on October 12, 2002.  
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These attacks confirmed JI was the most serious, lethal threat to the United States, 
Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian countries. More importantly, the collective effort of 
JI’s members epitomized in these attacks show that despite both external and internal 
pressures on the group, its members could and would operate coherently to carry out 
major terrorist attacks in order to advance towards their objectives. By the time the Bali 
cell carried out its attacks in 2002, it was clear that JI’s members were a capable, 
committed, and coherent terrorist group. 
C. CONCLUSIONS ON POST-BALI 2002 TO JAKARTA 2009 
In response to the most coordinated, sophisticated attack JI elements had carried 
out to date, Southeast Asian governments and Indonesia’s Muslim majority public 
applied significant pressure to JI’s members and leadership. Throughout this period, SEA 
governments cracked down on JI elements, which led to the arrest or death of several 
hundred JI members. Muslims, outraged by the Bali cell’s attacks and subsequent JI 
bombings, withdrew support for JI’s cause. These pressures weighed down on JI’s 
leaders, some of which exacerbated their existing internal debate over the efficacy of 
attack tactics.390  
Still committed to JI’s ideology, external and internal pressures compelled JI’s 
leaders to evolve JI’s organizational structure and operations and tactics so that the group 
could continue their struggle. Evidence capturing these changes led analysts to develop 
interpretations to account for how JI was changing. The first and leading interpretation 
concluded that JI had become fractured. Two JI factions emerged, each one commanded 
by influential JI leaders who embraced different approaches of how JI’s members should 
wage jihad. Traditionalists or mainstream JI represented the consolidated JI movement. 
Their operations and tactics became largely administrative in nature. They worked to 
regenerate lost membership and resources primarily through religious outreach and 
engagement with civil society. Their efforts were aimed at preparing their members and 
the environment for a future, large-scale jihad at the right time. A much smaller pro-
violence division operated clandestinely, largely autonomously, and carried out annual 
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symbolic bombings under JI’s banner throughout 2005. They went to ground following 
heavy CT pressure in 2005, but regrouped and executed successful suicide bombings in 
2009. Evidence shows mainstream JI members throughout this period condemned pro-
violence bombings, but they did not condemn the pro-violence division per se, leading 
experts to believe that JI was no longer a cohesive, coherent organization. In summary, 
the conventional wisdom that JI had developed into two competing factions emerged.  
Alternative interpretations describing how JI was changing also surfaced. These 
interpretations recognized the friction between JI’s leaders, but claimed that describing JI 
as fractured was overlooking telling evidence. JI’s factions still shared an ideology, and 
there were clear indications JI’s divisions were coordinating their efforts at multiple 
levels. 
The author’s analysis of JI’s ideology, leadership, organizational structure, and 
operations and tactics captured in Chapter III of this thesis showed that the conventional 
wisdom was inaccurate. Indeed, JI had morphed into two divisions, but it was not 
divided. United through ideology, which provided needed continuity to the damaged 
movement, JI’s leaders had actually evolved the organization in creative and 
sophisticated ways. In response to various pressures, JI’s leaders changed JI’s structure, 
thus allowing members to “develop, improve, and employ new skills that enabled them to 
change their capabilities over time,” which in turn, allowed the movement to regenerate, 
expand and sustain a campaign of terrorist attacks.391 In truth, JI became mutually 
supportive administrative and operational divisions, namely traditionalists and pro-
violence militants respectively. This division of labor and duties allowed the movement 
to “act systematically to fulfill its needs, strengthen its capabilities, and advance its 
strategic agenda.”392 The author’s description shows JI evolved into a more effective 
organization, which allowed it to remain the single greatest security threat to Indonesia 
and possibly to Southeast Asia.393 
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The evidence the author presented showed JI’s divisions at both the senior 
leadership and rank and file levels remained united, and they operated coherently through 
coordination and support of one another’s activities. Having traced variation and 
continuity in key JI characteristics, it is more accurate to describe JI’s divisions as 
mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.394 Overtly, the two divisions were factions, 
but in fact, traditionalist activities both directly and indirectly supported pro-violence 
militant operations and vice versa. As the author showed, in arguably every one of JI’s 
pro-violence attacks during this period, pro-violence elements sought and received 
logistical, personnel, and safe haven from traditionalist sources, demonstrating clearly 
that JI’s divisions have continued to work in concert. JI did not split; it evolved 
coherently. As such, throughout this period JI remained the most lethal threat to 
Indonesia, SEA nations and U.S. interests in the region. 
D. CONCLUSIONS ON POST-JAKARTA 2009 TO PRESENT 
The suicide bombings that JI’s pro-violence elements carried out in Jakarta in 
2009 and the evidence surrounding them jolted intelligence and security communities and 
puzzled experts. Several successful CT raids on pro-violence caches and safe houses and 
four years of relative peace in Indonesia led experts to believe the JI movement was 
fractured, damaged beyond near-term repair, and unlikely to mount coordinated, 
sophisticated attacks. This was clearly not the case. Evidence from investigations 
following Jakarta 2009 showed that Top and his pro-violence division supported by 
traditionalists who provided manpower, logistics, and safe haven were actively 
cooperating and operating coherently to launch attacks aimed at undermining Indonesian 
and Western governments in order to advance towards their shared ideological objectives. 
Top and some of his pro-violence operators were neutralized shortly after the attack. 
However, that did not signal the end of JI’s pro-violence division or the coordination of 
administrative and operational efforts between mainstream JI and JI pro-violence 
militants.  
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As presented in Chapter IV of this thesis, the conventional wisdom’s description 
of how JI’s leaders evolved the group was inaccurate. The author’s description of JI’s 
evolution from Jakarta 2009 through present day showed that despite continued debate 
between senior JI leadership, JI’s traditionalist and pro-violence camps continued to carry 
out administrative and operational duties, respectively, and functioned as a coherent 
terrorist organization as demonstrated in JI’s latest bombings. Its members remained 
committed to their shared ideology, and they evolved their divisions in such a way that 
they could remain cohesive and operate effectively largely under the radar of intelligence, 
security experts, and regional CT authorities. Moreover, recent evidence the author 
presented, specifically the development of JAT and the AQA coalition, shows that 
influential mainstream JI leaders continue to learn and adapt. The aftermath of both 
Jakarta 2009 and mainstream JI’s shortcomings led JI leaders’ Ba’asyir and Dulmatin to 
make more overt moves to consolidate JI’s functional divisions under one leader. They 
recently joined forces with JI pro-violence militants and also with substantial elements of 
the jihadi movement writ large in an attempt to consolidate their operational and tactical 
capabilities to create an even more effective, diverse terrorist threat and place JI at its 
decision-making center. JI leaders’ latest evolution of the group failed. The aftermath of 
AQA’s dismantling has led to a “weak and divided” JI and jihadi movement.395 
However, if JI’s history can provide any hints of its future, it is likely that JI’s remaining 
members at large will bounce back, mutate, and strike again. 
E. AN ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF HOW JI HAS EVOLVED 
Having reviewed this thesis’s findings, it is now clearly accurate to describe JI’s 
evolution as one united terrorist group compelled to evolve into two separate but 
mutually supportive administrative and operational divisions, which jointly execute near- 
and long-term tactical strategies in order to advance their shared ideological objectives. 
This evolution has allowed JI’s members to survive and maintain their struggle without 
sacrificing the long-term strategy of the group or exposing traditionalists to heavy CT 
pressure. While they continue to experience setbacks, JI’s evolution has allowed the 
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movement to be resilient and find ways to reemerge and fight another day. JI’s 
traditionalist and pro-violence divisions working both separately and in concert represent 
a progressively more lethal and difficult threat for American and Indonesian authorities to 
combat. 
The author’s description of JI’s evolution showed how traditionalists and pro-
violence elements supported, not detracted from, one another’s activities. Recent events 
indicate JI’s leaders remain united through ideology, and they continue to evolve their 
networks, converging and diverging as necessary in order to advance towards their 
objectives. So despite the failure of JAT and AQA, there are reasons to believe JI will 
adapt and evolve again because traditionalists continue to grow the capabilities the JI 
movement needs to not only survive but more importantly, to carry out terrorist attacks.  
F. THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING AN ACCURATE DESCRIPTION 
Describing accurately how JI has evolved is extremely important for a number of 
reasons. At the broadest level, JI represents yet another case in which a terrorist group 
refuses to end, so its leaders and members evolve in creative and successful ways in 
response to external and internal pressures. This type of evolution allows a group to 
regenerate and sustain activities that support their objectives, despite considerable losses 
and changes to their CT and public environment. More importantly, understanding now 
that JI’s divisions work in far more coherent ways than previously thought, one can 
revise the conventional wisdom and develop new approaches to dealing with JI and 
terrorist groups like it.  
G. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The author’s description of how JI has evolved impacts Indonesia and its allies’ 
CT policies in one major way: it means observers of the region have to understand that 
while Indonesian and Southeast Asia’s counterterrorism operations and capabilities have 




the whole picture. Traditionalists are far more important to JI’s struggle then they have 
been given credit for. Understanding that, regional authorities must adjust current CT 
responses accordingly.  
While Indonesia and their allies’ CT efforts have curtailed JI’s terrorist activities 
in commendable ways, they continue to fall short of adequately addressing the problem 
of defeating the JI movement’s ability to regenerate itself. Killing or detaining terrorist 
operatives alone does not reduce the ability of JI’s religious ideologues to preach JI’s 
insidious yet seductive salafi jihadi ideology and recruit new blood and generate new 
resources with it.396 CT authorities must counter JI differently than they have been. If CT 
authorities do not, history and recent events show that remaining traditionalists and pro-
violence militants—or the latest mutation—will not only retain the capacity for violence 
but they also retain the ability to regenerate. Regional CT policies have to change in order 
to combat the JI/jihadi threat more thoroughly. As should be clear by now, JI’s ideology 
taught by traditionalists, espoused in traditionalist publications and preached during 
religious outreach and social service activities’ is the root of JI’s continued survival. 
Traditionalists use JI’s ideology to continue to grow new generations of jihadists and 
generate resources, and JI’s ideology motivates pro-violence militants to continue to 
mount and carry out acts of massive, lethal violence.  
Security experts with influence in the region need to emphasize to regional 
authorities that traditionalists are the heart of the JI movement. Comprehensive 
intelligence describing links between traditionalists and pro-violence militants remains 
insufficient.397 Authorities should closely monitor traditionalist efforts because it is they 
who enable JI pro-violence operatives to carry out attacks and allow the JI and jihadi 
movement to continue to recover. It is no doubt a slippery slope because “the lines 
between violent and non-violent organizations” are muddy and pressuring them 
haphazardly could lead to more harm than good.398 It is clear that Indonesia’s 
counterterrorism success thus far has been perceived as “politically legitimate because it 
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has not come at the expense of rule of law or democracy.”399 That being said, since 2004, 
JI traditionalists have been “active in fundraising, social-welfare activities, humanitarian 
relief and dakwah.”400 It is known that these efforts “facilitate recruitment and not 
infrequently provide shelter” to JI pro-violent militants, yet Indonesian authorities remain 
unequipped to crackdown on all facets of JI’s sophisticated network.401 Indonesia and its 
allies must find effective ways of continuing to investigate and prosecute direct acts of 
terrorism, and at the same time develop and institutionalize a program to combat 
traditionalists effectively or else the region will continue to only treat the symptoms, not 
cure the disease. 
Creating enduring partnerships with an increase in information sharing; 
monitoring of suspected terrorists and their support networks; and tactics, techniques and 
procedures exchanges between U.S. Australian, South and Southeast Asian intelligence, 
security, and CT authorities is a first and important step. By doing so, the probability of 
developing a better idea of what the danger signs of terrorist radicalization and “inciting 
violence” look like and stronger evidence of enduring links between pro-violence 
terrorists and traditionalists will increase. This will begin to provide regional law 
enforcement with the tools they need to not only prosecute terrorist actors but also disable 
the proliferation of JI’s ideology and defeat the movement once and for all in a 
transparent, legitimate, lasting way.402 
 
                                                 
399 Abuza, “Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward,” 7. 
400 Ibid., 8. 
401 ICG Asia Briefing 107, 12. 
402 ICG Asia Briefing 95, 13; and Jones, “Briefing for the New President: The Terrorist Threat in 
Indonesia and Southeast Asia,” 78. 
 121
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abuza, Zachary. “New Directions for Indonesian Militants after Successful  
Counterterrorist Operations.” Terrorism Monitor, vol VIII, 41 (November 2010).  
6-7. 
 
———. “Fall of the Teflon Terrorist?” Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs  
Council (August 2010). 
 
———. “Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward.” Terrorism  
Monitor: In-Depth Analysis of the War on Terror. The Jamestown Foundation  
VIII, 2 (January 14, 2010).  
 
———. “Making Sense of the Jakarta Bombings: The Shades of Grey.”  
Counterterrorism Blog. Accessed May 13, 2010.  
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/07/making_sense_of_the_jakarta_bo.php. 
 
———. “The State of Jemaah Islamiyah: Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast  
Asia Five Years After Bali.” The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies  
Research Briefing Series, vol. 2, no. 1 (November 2007). 
 
———. Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia. New York, NY: Routledge  
Publishers, 2007. 
 
———. “Abu Dujana: Jemaah Islamiyah's New al-Qaeda Linked Leader.”  
Terrorism Focus 3, 13 (2006). 
 
———. “Al-Qaeda Comes to Southeast Asia.” Terrorism and Violence in  
Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability. Paul J.  
Smith ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, 44-46.  
 
———. Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror. Boulder, CO:  
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. 
 
Acharya, Amitav and Arabinda Acharya. “The Myth of the Second Front: Localizing the  
‘War On Terror’ in Southeast Asia. ” The Washington Quarterly, (2007). 
 








The Age. “Military Shock and Awe Won’t Overcome Terrorism.” Sydney Morning  
Herald. January 08, 2010. http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/editorial/military-
shock-and-awe-wont-overcome-terrorism-20100107-lwqw.html 
 
Agencies. “Malaysia Suspects Linked to Bomber.” Al Jazeera English Asia-Pacific.  
January 28, 2010.  
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/01/201012893539919721.html. 
 
Agencies. “Jakarta Hotel Bombing Trial Begins.” Al Jazeera English Asia-Pacific.  
February 10, 2010.          
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/02/201021053631787690.html. 
 
Aglionby, John. "Al-Qaeda Link Is Suspected in Jakarta Blasts." The Washington Post,  
July 18, 2009. 
 
Aglionby, John with additional reporting from Taufan Hidayat (Jakarta). “Indonesia’s  




Allard, Tom. “Hotel Bombing Suspect Goes On Trial.” Sydney Morning Herald.  




———. “Training Camp Raid Sparks Fears Over Terrorist Resurgence.” The Sydney  




“Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the ‘Ngruki Network’ in Indonesia.” ICG  
Indonesia Briefing. (August 8, 2002). 
 
Andriyanto, Heru. “I Plotted to Kill SBY, Admits Jakarta Hotel Bombing Suspect.” The  




———. “Man Gets Eight Years for Sheltering Hotel Bombers.” The Jakarta  







Andriyanto, Heru and Nurdin Hasan. “Aceh Seen as a ‘Safe Haven’ for Terror Group  










———. “US Trial for Accused Bali Bomber Hambali.” The Jakarta Globe.  









“Arrested Development – Jemaah Islamiyah Down but not Out.” Jane’s Intelligence  
Review (July 19, 2007). 
 
Backgrounder on “Jemaah Islamiyah” Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism page. 






________ “Fugitive Mastermind of 2002 Bali Bombing Still Alive: RP Military.”  




________ “Police Say Bali Bomber May Have Cheated Death.” Philippine News  
Net. February 09, 2010. 
http://www.philippinesnews.net/story/599539. 
 
________“Police detect terrorist suspects Umar Patek, Heru Kuncoro.” The Jakarta Post.  





Bakkara, Binsar. “Indonesia’s Changing Face of Terrorism.” The Associated Press.  




Barton, Greg. “The historical development of Jihadi Islamist thought in Indonesia.” In  
Helfstein Scott ed. Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia. The Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, 2009.  
 
———. Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam. Sydney,  
AUS: UNSW Press, 2004. 
 
Baswedan, Anies R. “Political Islam in Indonesia.” Asian Survey 44, 5 (2004): 669-690. 
 
Batley, Brek. The Complexities of Dealing With Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: A Case  
Study of Jemaah Islamiyah. Strategic and Defence Studies Center: The Australian  
National University: Canberra: 2003. 
 
Berman, Sheri. “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society.” Perspectives on Politics.  
American Political Science Association, vol. 1, no. 2, June 2003. 
 
Blackburn, Susan. “Indonesian Women and Political Islam.” Journal of Southeast Asian  
Studies 39, 1 (February 2008): 83-105. 
 
Bohari, Othman. “Singapore News - Efforts to Curb Radicalism Must Continue, Say  




“Bomb Attacks Hit Jakarta Hotels.” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly (July 17, 2009). 
 
Brummitt, Chris. “Web chats point to al-Qaida's Indonesian links.” Associated Press. 




Chalk, Peter, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, and Leanne Piggot. The Evolving  
Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2009. 
 
Chalk, Peter and Carl Ungerer.  “Neighbourhood Watch: The Evolving Terrorist threat in  
Southeast Asia.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute. June 2008. 
 
Chalk, Peter. “Militant Islamic Extremism.” Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia:  
Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability. Paul J. Smith ed. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. 
 125
Conboy, Ken. The Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network.  
Jakarta, IND: Equinox Publishing, 2006. 
 
Cragin, Kim and Sara A. Daly. The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group 
Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2004. 
 
Cragin, Kim and Scott Gerwehr. Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle  
Against Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005. 
 
CRS Report RL31672. Terrorism in Southeast Asia. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Richard  
Cronin, Larry Niksch, Bruce Vaughn. (2004): 1-54. 
 









———. “Terrorism Today: Jemaah Islamiyah, Dulmatin and the Aceh Cell.” East  




———. “The Usual Suspects Moved from JI to the Noordin Network.” The Sydney  




Fealy, Greg and Aldo Borgu. “Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia.”  
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (September 2005). 
 
Gelling, Peter. “Police Kill Bali Nightclub Bombing Suspect.” The New York Times.  
March 09, 2010. Jakarta, Indonesia.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/world/asia/10indo.html. 
 
Gunaratna, Rohan. “The Ideology of Al-Jema’ah Al-Islamiyah.” in Hillel Fradkin,  
Husain Haqqani, and Eric Brown eds. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology.  





———. “Understanding Al-Qaeda and its Network.” Terrorism and Violence  
in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability.  
Paul J. Smith ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, 70-72. 
 
———. The Changing Face of Terrorism. Singapore: Eastern Universities  
Press, 2004. 
 
———. Inside Al-Qaeda. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002. 
 
Hafidz, Tatik S. and Nanyang Technological University. Institute of Defence and  
Strategic Studies. The War on Terror and the Future of Indonesian Democracy. 
Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological 
University, 2003. 
 
Hamilton-Hart, Natasha. “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: expert analysis, myopia and  
fantasy.” The Pacific Review 18, 3 (2005): 303-325. 
 
Hasan, Noorhaidi. “Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of  
Transition in Indonesia.” Indonesia 73 (April 2002): 145-169. 
 
Hastings, J. "Geography, Globalization, and Terrorism: The Plots of Jemaah Islamiyah."  
Security Studies 17, 3 (July 1, 2008): 505. 
 
“Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad Central Sulawesi.” ICG Asia Report 74 (February 2004).  
 
“Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates.” ICG  
Asia Report 43 (December 2002). 
 
“Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).” ICG Asia Briefing 107  
(July 2010).  
 
“Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh.” ICG Asia Report 189 (April 2010). 
 
“Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base.” ICG Asia Briefing 95 (August 2009). 
  
“Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings.” ICG Asia Briefing 94 (July 2009).  
 
“Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry.” ICG Asia Report 147 (February 
2008). 
 
“Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status.” ICG Asia Briefing 63 (May 2007). 
 




Ismail, Noor Huda. “The July 17 Jakarta Suicide Attacks and the Death of Noordin Top.”  
CTC Sentinel, 2, 9 (September 2009): 20-22. 
 
Ismail, Noor Huda and Carl Ungerer. “Jemaah Islamiyah: A renewed struggle?”  
Australian Strategic Policy Institute. July 2009. 
 
Jackson, Brian A, and Baker, John C. Cragin, Kim, Parachini, John, Trujillo, Horacio R.,  
Chalk, Peter. “Volume One: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its  
Implications for Combating Terrorism.” Aptitude for Destruction. Santa Monica,  
CA: RAND, 2005. 
 
———. “Volume Two: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five  
Terrorist Groups.” Aptitude for Destruction. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005. 
 
“Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous.” ICG Asia Report  
63 (August 2003). 
 
Jones, Seth G., and Martin C. Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for  
Countering Al Qa'ida. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008. 
 
Jones, Sidney. “Jemaah Islamiyah and New Splinter Groups.” in Arnaud de Borchgrave,  
Thomas Sanderson and David Gordon eds. Conflict, Community, and Criminality 
in Southeast Asia and Australia, Assessments from the Field. A Report of the 
CSIS Transnational Threats Project Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington D.C. (June 2009).  
 
———. “Briefing for the New President: The Terrorist Threat in Indonesia and  
Southeast Asia.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 618:1 (2008), 69-78. 
 
———. “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah.” Australian Journal of  
International Affairs 59, 2 (2005), 169-178. 
 
———. “Jemaah Islamiyah: A Short Description.” International Seminar, Islamic  
Militant Movements in Southeast Asia. July 22-24, Mulia Hotel, Jakarta 2003. 
 
Koschade, Stuart. “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to  
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006),  
559-575. 
 







Malik, Candra. “Radical Islam Still a Threat in Indonesia: Experts.” Jakarta Globe.  




Malley, Michael S. "Indonesia in 2002: The Rising Cost of Inaction." Asian Survey 43, 1,  
A Survey of Asia in 2002 (Jan – Feb 2003): 135-146. 
 
 
Meyer, Josh and John M. Glionna. "Terrorist group's resurgence feared; The Indonesia  
attacks may signal Jemaah Islamiyah's revival of a campaign of violence." Los  
Angeles Times, July 18, 2009. 
 
Mujani, Saiful and R. William Liddle. “Muslim Indonesia’s Secular Democracy.” Asian  
Survey 49, 4 (July/August 2009): 575-900. 
Padden, Brian. “Security Experts say Indonesian Terrorism Threat Growing.” Voice of 
America. March 24, 2010. http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Security-
Experts-say-Terrorism-Threat-in-Indonesia-Is-Growing--89000642.html.  
 
———. “Indonesia Uses ‘Soft Approach’ to Contain Terrorist Threat.” Voice of  




Pavlova, Elena. “From a Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah  
Islamiyah According to PUPJI.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30 (2007): 777-
800. 
 
Rabasa, Angel. “Radical Islamic Ideologies in Southeast Asia.” in Hillel Fradkin, Husain  
Haqqani, and Eric Brown eds. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. Washington 
D.C.: Hudson Institute (2005): 31. 
 
Ramakrishna, Kumar. “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia.”  
Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, 3 (Dec 2005): 344, 350-353. 
 
Ramakrishna, Kumar and See S. Tan. After Bali: the Threat of Terrorism in  
Southeast Asia. World Scientific; Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. 
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 2003. 
 
Schonhardt, Sara. “ Indonesia Pulls Strings to Tackle Terror.” Asia Times. January 15,  
2010. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LA15Ae01.html 
 
Singh, Bilveer. The Talibanization of Southeast Asia. Westport, CT: Praeger Security  
International, 2007. 
 129
———. “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia.” The Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 58, 1 (2004): 47-68. 
 
Smith, Anthony L. "The Politics of Negotiating the Terrorist Problem in Indonesia." 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, 1 (2005): 33-44. 
 
———. “Terrorism and the Political Landscape in Indonesia.” Terrorism and  
Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional 
Stability. Smith, Paul J. ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005. 
 
Tan, Andrew. "Terrorism, Insurgency and Religious Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia."  
Defence Studies 8, 3 (September 1, 2008): 311.  
 
———. A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia.  
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007. 
 
Tan, See and Kumar Ramakrishna. “Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast  
Asia’s War on Terror.” SAIS Review 24, 1 (Winter – Spring 2004): 91-105. 
 
“Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks.” ICG Asia Report 114 (May 2006).  
 
Walt, Stephen M. “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International  
Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science (November 2005): 23-48. 
 
“Weakening Indonesia Mujahidin Networks: Lessons for Maluku and Poso.” ICG Asia  
Report 103 (October 2005). 
 
White Paper. The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism. Singapore:  
Ministry of Home Affairs 2003. 
 
Whitmire, James C. “Jemaah Islamiyah Remains Active and Deadly.” In Michael T.  
Kindt and Post Jerrold, M., Schneider Barry R. eds. The Most Threatening 






THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 131
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
 
